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Preface 
 
As we interact with our environment, we feel that we construct veridical and 
durable representations of our surroundings.  However, despite the fact that the human 
brain contains billions of neurons and trillions of synaptic connections, there are striking 
limits on perceptual and working memory capacity—we are only consciously aware of a 
subset of sensory information and can only maintain a handful of fragile representations 
over short intervals. Indeed, it has been suggested that working memory is constrained 
by a single, amodal attentional capacity (Cowan, 2006). What is the source of limits in 
attention and working memory: Do they stem from a single, limited-capacity process, or 
are limits due to the interaction of multiple capacity-limited components?  One important 
test of the specificity or generality of capacity limits is whether interference between two 
attention or two working memory tasks occurs irrespective of stimulus content.   Here I 
use a dual-task methodology to measure the interference between auditory and visual 
stimuli.  The use of auditory and visual stimuli provides a strong test as to whether the 
capacity of attention and working memory is restricted in a content-specific fashion.  The 
perception of auditory and visual stimuli relies on distinct brain regions processing 
(DeYoe & Van Essen, 1988; Fritz, Elhilali, David, Shamma, 2007).  Additionally, only 
minimal cross-modal interference is observed in some task combinations (Alais, 
Morrone, & Burr, 2006; Cocchini, Logie, Della Sala, MacPherson, & Baddeley).  
This dissertation begins with a description and definition of capacity limits within 
perceptual attention and working memory.  The motivation and importance of the 
research question is discussed.  I then describe the dual-task methodology, which can 
be used to assess whether two tasks tap into an undifferentiated capacity, or tap into 
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(partially) dissociable processes.  In the final section of Chapter I, I discuss how this 
dual-task methodology has been previously applied to show that visual attention and 
visual working memory have partially dissociable capacity limits. The second chapter of 
the dissertation examines whether there are domain-general or domain-specific limits in 
maintaining perceptual representations in working memory.  The third chapter asks 
whether our ability to track perceptual information is dependent on the modality of the 
attended information.  The dissertation concludes by discussing the implications of the 
findings and how they may inform theoretical models of attention and working memory.   
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CHAPTER I   
 
CAPACITY LIMITS IN ATTENTION AND WORKING MEMORY 
 
Description of capacity limits in perceptual attention and working memory 
Perceptual attention 
In some theories attention is considered to be a limited-capacity resource 
capable of processing stimuli (e.g. Kahneman, 1973; Norman & Bobrow, 1975), while 
others describe attention as the selective component in our information processing 
architecture (e.g. Broadbent, 1958).  Commonly, both metaphors of attention stress the 
need to select a subset of information for access to limited-capacity perceptual 
processing.  At which stage of processing does selection occur? There is evidence that 
attention can affect early perceptual processing (Cherry, 1953; Mangun & Hillyard, 1991) 
or later processing stages (Osman & Moore, 1993). The strong support for both early 
and late selection has led to the proposal that there may be more than one stage of 
attentional selection (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004; Luck & Vecera, 2002; 
Posner & Boies, 1971; Posner & Peterson, 1990). As an example, one influential theory 
argues for separate alerting, orienting, and executive attention networks (Posner & 
Boies, 1971; Posner & Peterson, 1990). The alerting network controls the general state 
of responsiveness to sensory stimulation, the orienting network selects a subset of 
sensory information for limited-capacity processing, and executive attention selects 
among post-sensory representations to resolve conflict among competing responses.  
The focus of this dissertation is on attentional effects within the orienting network, here 
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defined as perceptual attention (Johnston, McCann, Remington, 1995; Luck & Vecera, 
2002; Pashler 1989, 1991, 1993; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2005).   
Several paradigms reveal limits in perceptual attention and demonstrate 
processing benefits for selected stimuli at the expense of unselected information.  
Spatial cuing paradigms show that performance is significantly improved if participants 
receive advance information about the location of a subsequent target (Downing & 
Pinker, 1985; Posner, 1980). Similarly, when two visual objects are presented 
concurrently under time pressure, participants can only report properties of one stimulus 
accurately (Bonnel & Miller, 1994; Norman & Bobrow, 1975; Sperling & Dosher, 1986).  
Research also reveals limits in selectivity.  Divided attention paradigms such as dichotic 
listening and multiple-object tracking (MOT) paradigms reveal that participants can 
selectively attend to and process one or more task-relevant stimuli and ignore task-
irrelevant items (Cherry, 1953; Moray, 1959; Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Sears & Pylyshyn, 
2000).  However, there are limits to the maximum number of stimuli that can be 
simultaneously attended.  For example, participants have difficulty tracking more than 
four targets in a MOT task (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988) and following more than one 
auditory passage in dichotic listening tasks (Cherry, 1953; Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 
2001).   
 
Working memory  
Whenever we have to jot down a phone number, solve a complex math problem, 
or engage in lengthy conversations, we rely on our capability to store information in a 
highly active and accessible state where it is available for other cognitive processes 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).  This ability, termed working memory (WM), is a fundamental 
aspect of cognition and is linked to other mental faculties such as attentional control, 
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language acquisition, problem solving, task switching, and general intelligence 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1986; Duncan, 1995; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & 
Conway, 1999; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Kane & Engle, 1997, 2002; Roberts, Hager, & 
Heron, 1994; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004).  Yet, while WM is critically important in 
our day-to-day lives, its capacity is surprisingly limited.  People struggle to store more 
than a handful of representations, and often fail to detect rather salient changes between 
two display separated by a short temporal interval (Cowan, 2001; Cowan, Zhijian, & 
Rouder, 2004; Henderson, 1972; Hollingworth, 2004; Irwin, 1992; Luck & Vogel, 1997; 
Miller, 1956; Pashler, 1988; Rensink, 2000, 2002).   
A common task used to assess the limits of WM storage capacity is to give 
participants a set of stimuli to remember (a sample display) over a short temporal 
interval.  The number of representations that can be stored is measured by the set size 
of the sample and accuracy at determining whether a subsequent probe display is the 
same as or different from the sample (Cowan, 2001; Pashler, 1988).  Miller (1956) 
famously suggested that 7 +/- 2 items may be stored in WM.  This estimate has been 
revised by many researchers to suggest that the capacity of WM is 4 +/- 1 (Cowan, 
2001; Cowan, Zhijian, & Rouder, 2004; Henderson, 1972; Luck & Vogel, 1997).  
However, WM performance is not simply limited by the number of items that need to be 
stored, there are also limits in the fidelity of representations (Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007; 
Magnussen & Greenlee, 1992, 1999; Wilken & Ma, 2004; Zhang & Luck, 2008), and WM 
task performance may depend on the information load of the stimuli that have to be 
stored (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Fougnie, Asplund, & Marois, submitted).   
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Nature of capacity limits: A single source or separate sources? 
 One influential proposal suggests that a single capacity-limited process underlies 
the striking limits in both attention and working memory (Cowan, 1995, 2001, 2006; 
Duncan 1994).  Support for this proposal includes remarkably similar capacity estimates 
across attention and working memory tasks, particularly for visual stimuli (Cowan, 2001; 
Rensink 2002).  However, interference between two visual working memory tasks has 
been found to be more severe than between a visual working memory and visual 
attention task (Fougnie & Marois, 2006).  Based on this finding, I suggested that 
attention and working memory were constrained by multiple sources of capacity.  
Evidence against a single, amodal source of capacity that underlies attention and 
working memory is also found in dual-task studies that require participants to attend to or 
maintain two sets of stimuli from different modalities.  Such studies often find little or no 
cost between modalities (e.g. Alais, et al., 2006; Duncan, Martens, & Ward, 1997; Soto-
Faraco & Spence, 2002; Treisman & Davies, 1973; Cocchini, et al., 2002; Scarborough, 
1972).  However, as described in the following sections, such findings are not universal 
(e.g. Saults & Cowan, 2007) and do not sufficiently rule out potential confounds and 
alternate interpretations.   
 The issue of domain-general or domain-specific sources for working memory has 
been extensively studied with a typical finding being small but significant interference 
between concurrent auditory and visual WM loads (e.g. Cocchini et al., 2002; Fougnie & 
Marois, 2006; Scarborough, 1972), consistent with partially overlapping sources of WM 
capacity across sensory domains, but also consistent with additional content-specific 
sources of capacity.  However, there is one finding suggesting that a dual-task paradigm 
can show evidence of complete capacity sharing between the two modalities (Saults & 
Cowan, 2007).  Thus, there is no consensus on whether WM capacity is differentiated by 
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modality.  This is particularly true considering that previous findings of dual-task costs 
might also reflect non-mnemonic sources of interference such as increases in executive 
load, overlap in representational content (such as overlap in propositional coding 
between tasks), or perceptual interference (Cocchini, et al., 2002; Postle, D’esposito, & 
Corkin, 2005) rather than competition for a domain-general WM system.   
 This issue of domain-general or domain-specific capacity limits has also been 
extensively studied in perceptual attention tasks.  Previous experimental findings 
generally show no interference between auditory and visual attention tasks (Alais, et al., 
2006; Duncan, et al., 1997; Larsen, McIlhadda, Baert, & Bundesen, 2003; Soto-Faraco & 
Spence, 2002).  In contrast, neurophysiological evidence shows that attending to one 
modality leads to reduced neural activity for stimuli in another modality (Johnson & 
Zatorre, 2005, 2006).  One possible explanation for this apparent discrepancy in findings 
is that behavioral costs were not shown because previous studies may have allowed 
participants to time-share their attention across modalities.  These studies used target 
detection tasks where the target-defining stimulus features were supplied in advance of 
the target.  In those tasks, participants could perform well in the absence of constant 
attention if they set up target templates (Duncan & Humphries, 1989) that would act to 
summon attention in a stimulus-driven fashion whenever a task-relevant target 
appeared.  This account is speculative, but raises the possibility that costs across 
modalities will occur in tasks that require participants to attend to sources of information 
where a pre-specified target is not supplied.  The current studies required participants to 
constantly track feature properties of target stimuli as the features continuously and 
unpredictably changed over a sustained period of time.  Cross-modal costs under such 
conditions would place limits on the conditions under which auditory and visual attention 
tasks don’t interfere.  
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Summary of studies and predictions 
In order to address the unitary or divisible nature of our capacity-limited cognitive 
architecture, this dissertation examines the degree to which performance limits in 
perceptual attention and working memory are differentiated by modality.  The current 
work addresses weaknesses in past studies that prevent strong conclusions from being 
drawn.   
Chapter 2 asks to what degree auditory and visual WM interfere with each other 
if the WM tasks are designed to minimize interference from non-mnemonic sources such 
as executive processing (Cocchini, et al., 2002; Postle, et al., 2005). In Chapter 3, I ask 
whether there is a common attentional system shared between auditory and visual 
attention networks using tasks that require participants to continuously track target 
information over a long duration.  
What predictions can be made about the degree of interference across modalities 
in attention and working memory tasks?  It is known that in some dual-task conditions it 
is possible to observe large costs between two tasks in different modalities.  For 
example, costs are observed between cell-phone conversations and visual navigation 
tasks (Strayer, Drews, & Johnston, 2003; Strayer & Johnston, 2001).  One possibility is 
that competition between auditory and visual tasks will depend on whether those tasks 
load on early or late stages of processing. Specifically, if two tasks compete for 
perceptual processing no costs are expected, as it is proposed that there are individual 
perceptual processing capacities for auditory and visual stimuli (Alais, et al., 2006; 
Duncan, et al., 1997; Larsen et al., 2003).  However, if the tasks compete at later 
response stages, such as response selection, it is suggested that auditory and visual 
stimuli compete for a domain-general capacity (Jolicoeur, 1999b; Jolicoeur, & 
Dell’Acqua, 1998; 1999; Pashler, 1994; but see Mohr & Linden, 2005). Importantly, this 
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predicts that dual-task costs will not be found between perceptual tracking tasks, even if 
those tasks require the constant tracking of stimulus features, as these tasks do not 
place concurrent demands on response selection.  However, since there is no 
consensus on whether consolidation in memory draws on the same stage of attention 
involved in response selection (Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Blake & Fox, 1969; Dell’Acqua 
& Jolicoeur, 2000; Giesbrecht, Dixon, & Kingstone, 2001; Jolicoeur, & Dell’Acqua, 1998; 
1999; Jolicoeur, 1999b; Pashler, 1991, 1993; Posner & Boies, 1971), few predictions 
can be made from this theory on dual-task costs in WM.   
Alternatively, dual-task costs between auditory and visual stimuli may depend on 
whether the two tasks require the processing, updating, or manipulation of information, 
or whether the tasks are ‘offline’ in the sense that they require storage and not 
processing (Duff & Logie, 2001; McElree, 2001; Oberauer, 2002; Oberauer, Demmrich, 
Mayr, & Kliegl, 2001).  Such frameworks suggest that representations can be maintained 
in WM through self-sustaining activity in domain-specific stores (even in the absence of 
top-down signals) (Hopfield, 1982; Washburn & Astur, 1998), whereas attention is 
considered to be a limited-capacity amodal resource (Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Duff & 
Logie, 2001; Oberauer & Kliegl, 2006).  It may seem that failures to observe dual-task 
costs between auditory and visual attention tasks presents a problem for the processing 
versus storage distinction.  However, it is possible that such failures occurred only 
because in such tasks attention can be shared between modalities.  The attention tasks 
employed in the present dissertation, which require constant tracking of feature values, 
provide a stronger test for such frameworks.  The processing versus storage distinction 
also predicts that dual-task costs between auditory and visual WM tasks will decrease as 
the tasks require less executive control to perform in tandem (Cocchini, et al., 2002).   
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Dual-task methodology 
Before discussing individual experiments, it will be helpful to briefly outline the 
basic dual-task methodology used in the studies described here.  In this paradigm, two 
tasks are to be concurrently performed separately or concurrently and the load of each 
task is varied.  Dual-task costs can be measured by comparing single- to dual-task 
performance, or by the decrease in performance as task load increases. These costs 
can be compared to task combinations in which the tasks are known to tap into the same 
capacity limit (e.g. two visual WM tasks).  Thus, the magnitude of interference relative to 
other task combinations provides a powerful tool to examine the overlap in processing 
between tasks.  However, one must be careful that the tasks used are well equated for 
difficulty (Lee, Koch, & Braun, 1999) and that interference does not occur at stages of 
processing ancillary to the processing stage of interest, such as interference during 
encoding into or retrieval from WM (Cowan & Morey, 2007; Eng, Chen, & Jiang, 2005; 
Sligte, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008).  The current experiments were designed to minimize 
these concerns and, where possible, address them with additional experiments or 
analyses.   
 
Application of dual-task methodology: Relationship between attention and WM 
 To demonstrate the utility of the dual-task paradigm, I will describe its application 
to study whether attention and WM tap into the same capacity-limited process (Fougnie 
& Marois, 2006).  Perceptual attention involves the selective maintenance of sensory 
representations for perceptual processing, while WM involves the selection of stored 
representations for limited WM capacity.  Since both attention and WM involve the 
selection of task-relevant information at the expense of other information, it is prudent to 
consider the similarity of these two constructs. Indeed, several researchers have argued 
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that attention is the capacity-limited process that constrains visual working memory 
(VWM) capacity (Cowan, 2001; Rensink, 2000, 2002). Before describing the dual-task 
study, I briefly review the evidence for a common attention and WM process below, 
including: 1) evidence that attention and WM have strikingly similar capacity limits, and 
2) dual-task interference between VWM and attention.  
Several researchers have noted the similarity in capacity limits for visual attention 
and VWM.  Multiple object tracking tasks reveal that participants can only simultaneously 
attend to 3-4 stimuli at a time (Oksama & Hyönä, 2004; Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Sears 
& Pylyshyn, 2000).  Similarly, estimates of the number of objects that can be stored in 
VWM also are in the range of 3-4 items (Pashler, 1988; Sperling, 1960; Vogel, 
Woodman, & Luck, 2001).  This has led to the proposal that attention and VWM share 
the same capacity-limited processes (Cowan 2001; Rensink, 2002).  However, the 
similarity in capacity limits may be mere coincidence: given that capacity for attentional 
tracking and VWM tasks depends on various stimulus parameters such as the speed of 
the objects that need to be tracked (Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007) or the complexity of the 
items that need to be remembered (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004), it is not difficult for 
capacity estimates of either attentional or VWM tasks to depart from the typically 
observed range of 3-4.   
 Dual-task experiments that combine attention and WM tasks can reveal costs 
when these two tasks are combined (Awh, Jonides, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998; Oh & Kim, 
2004; Woodman & Luck, 2004).  This has been provided as evidence for a shared 
capacity limit.  However, additive dual-task costs between WM and attention are not 
always observed (Logan, 1978, 1979; Woodman, Vogel, & Luck, 2001) and may depend 
on the overlap of features across tasks.  Specifically, dual-task costs between attention 
and VWM occur when visual search tasks are paired with spatial WM tasks (Oh & Kim, 
 10 
2004; Woodman & Luck, 2004) or when object-based attention tasks are paired with 
VWM for object features (Matsukura & Vecera, 2009), but not when visual search is 
paired with object or verbal WM (Logan, 1978; Woodman et al., 2001). 
 Thus, previous evidence is insufficient to determine whether interference 
between attention and VWM tasks reflects capacity sharing and leaves unanswered 
whether previous findings of dual-task costs signify a shared capacity-limit or merely 
partial overlap in processing across tasks.  To address these questions, I recently 
conducted three experiments to measure dual-task costs between: visual attention and 
VWM, VWM and VWM, and auditory working memory (AWM) and VWM (Fougnie & 
Marois, 2006).  The results showed that VWM and attention interfered with each other 
and showed increased interference as task load increased.  However, the dual-task 
costs were less than when two tasks that tap into the same capacity-limited processes 
(VWM and VWM) were paired, but were greater than were found for a task pairing that 
typically shows little dual-task costs (VWM and AWM).  Additional control experiments 
attempted to rule out the possibility that differences in dual-task costs were due to 
differences in featural overlap between tasks (Fougnie & Marois, 2006) or to interference 
between tasks at encoding or retrieval stages (Fougnie & Marois, 2009B). The results 
suggested that VWM capacity is set by the interaction of visuospatial attentional, central 
amodal, and VWM-specific sources of processing.   
 11 
CHAPTER II 
 
ARE THERE SEPARATE WM STORES FOR  
AUDITORY AND SPATIAL STIMULI?  
 
Motivation for dual-task WM studies 
According to the influential multi-component model of Baddeley and colleagues 
(Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley & Logie, 1999) information is 
maintained in WM by slave systems specialized for a specific modality.  According to 
Cowan’s embedded processes model (Cowan, 1988; 1995), the capacity of WM is set by 
a single capacity-limited system that holds WM information in the focus of attention.  A 
critical distinction between these theories is the degree to which WM capacity is domain-
general. That is, is there a limited-capacity WM system that acts to store information 
regardless of the modality or content?   
Evidence in dual-task WM studies is generally in support of at least partially 
dissociable auditory and visual WM systems.  In a recent study (Fougnie & Marois, 
2006; Expt. 3) we observed dual-task costs between an auditory and visual WM task 
only at high dual-task load.  This is a common finding in the literature.  Studies that 
combine a low AWM (auditory working memory) load with a VWM (visual working 
memory) load observe no dual-task costs (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel et al., 2001), but 
when the AWM load is high the results show small, but significant dual-task costs 
(Cocchini, et al., 2002; Fougnie & Marois, 2006, Morey & Cowan, 2005; Scarborough, 
1972).  These costs seem to support the contribution of a domain-general store, and 
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further suggest that WM performance has contributions from both amodal and modality-
specific sources of capacity (Fougnie & Marois, 2006; but see Saults & Cowan, 2007). 
The finding of cross-modal interference in WM allows the potential for a neuroimaging 
experiment to locate the neural correlates of a domain-general storage system. Similar 
techniques have been used to identify the correlates of domain-specific storage of visual 
(Todd & Marois, 2004) or auditory (Zatorre, Evans, & Meyer, 1994) stimuli. 
However, before accepting that dual-task costs between auditory and visual WM 
tasks provides evidence of domain-general store, it is important to consider potential 
alternative explanations.  Can these costs be explained by the increased executive load 
of coordinating two simultaneous tasks in the dual-task condition (Cocchini, et al., 2002) 
or the use of tasks that overlap in representational content such as visual displays that 
are recoded in propositional or verbal forms (Postle et al., 2005)?  To address this, I 
designed WM tasks to minimize overlap in non-mnemonic processes and to be as 
distinct as possible in the task-relevant information.  In order to provide the strongest 
evidence that the interference between auditory and visual WM tasks represents 
competition for a domain-general storage system that is capable of storing any type of 
information, the auditory and visual WM task should be as distinct as possible.  Previous 
studies typically had participants encode and store object properties of auditory and/or 
visual objects.  A stronger test of a central WM store is to pair maintenance of auditory 
object features with maintenance of visuospatial locations, as there is evidence that our 
WM system may have distinct capacities and neural correlates for object and spatial 
features (Postle et al., 2005; Smith, Jonides, Koeppe, Awh, Schumacher, & Minoshima, 
1995; Tresch, Sinnamon, & Seamon, 1993; Ungerleider, Courtney, & Haxby, 1998; 
Ventre-Dominey, Bailly, Lavenne, LeBars, Mollion, Costes, & Dominey, 2005).  
Compounding this issue, many previous studies used visual WM tasks with object 
 13 
properties that could have been easily verbalized or encoded as propositions (Postle, et 
al., 2005).  For example, a participant might encode a propositional representation of the 
green square in Figure 5 as “green square on the right”.  It is possible that previous 
evidence for dual-task costs was due to interference at a representational level, and 
would therefore not provide strong support for a domain-general storage system.  
Second, many of the dual-task WM studies use stimuli that can be chunked or 
combined to form a higher order representation.  This is particularly true of spatial WM 
tasks that require participants to encode the location of a series of dots or squares (e.g. 
Cocchini et al., 2002).  Performance on this task may improve if participants chunk the 
individual locations into an object shape.  Chunking operations load on the modality-
independent central executive and could lead to dual-task costs. Finally, costs could also 
originate from having to perform two tasks concurrently, irrespective of the overlap in 
their storage capacity (Cocchini et al., 2002).  In a dual-task setting, participants will 
have to encode two displays, make two responses, and prepare for both tasks.  Having 
to coordinate performance for two tasks could load on the central executive, particularly 
if the task order is unpredictable (De Jong & Sweet, 1994).    
To reduce these non-mnemonic sources of interference I used a spatial working 
memory (SWM) task where the higher order structure formed by the stimuli (a line) was 
constant across trials and therefore not informative.  To further prevent grouping of 
items, sample stimuli never appeared in adjacent positions, and the probe stimulus 
either appeared in a matching or an adjacent location (Figure 1), requiring participants to 
memorize the exact spatial position of sample stimuli.  Finally, I presented two samples 
and required two responses on all trials to minimize differences between single- and 
dual-task conditions.  The task order was constant across trials to minimize changes in 
preparation across conditions (De Jong & Sweet, 1994).  In later studies (Expts. 3-6) I 
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excluded single-task conditions and manipulated task load so that all conditions involved 
performance of two tasks.  Thus, the present studies were designed to minimize the 
likelihood of observing dual-task costs that are not from competition for a domain-
general storage system.  
 
Experiment 1 
The first experiment compared the SWM task described above with an AWM task 
for spoken consonants.     
 
Methods 
Participants 
Seventeen young adults participated for course credit or monetary reward.  
 
Design 
Participants performed single-task AWM (20% of trials), single-task SWM (20% 
of trials), and dual-task trials (60% of trials) randomly intermixed within four blocks of 60 
trials.  For each task there were three manipulations of set size.  There were 16 trials per 
condition for each combination of dual-task and single-task load.  To keep task order 
constant across trials I embedded the SWM task within the retention interval of the AWM 
task.  
Participants were given bonus pay of 0-10$ based on their performance in the 
task.  For each single-task trial that participants answered correctly and for each dual-
task trial with both responses correct, participant’s bonus pay increased.  Participants 
were instructed to maintain fixation throughout each trial, and to emphasize the two 
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Figure 1: Example SWM display and potential 
locations for the SWM probe.   
 
tasks equally.  During practice blocks, participants were given response accuracy 
feedback during the 1000ms inter-trial interval 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SWM Task 
The SWM display consisted of 1, 3, or 5 white dots appearing along one of two 
black diagonal lines that crossed the screen to form an X (Figure 1).  The use of two 
diagonal lines also served to create a fixation point at the center of the screen where the 
lines crossed.  The stimuli always appeared on the same line within a block and were 
presented for 800ms.  Whether the stimuli appeared on the line that runs from top-left to 
bottom-right, or vice-versa changed between blocks. Participants were instructed to 
memorize the spatial positions indicated by the white dots.  A dot could occupy one of 12 
possible positions on a line, with the restriction that two dots could not occupy adjacent 
positions.  The spacing of positions was not constant but increased with increased 
distance from fixation.  The two nearest positions were separated by .5º. With each step 
from fixation the spacing increased by 33% such that the spacing for the farthest 
adjacent dots was 2.77º.  This spacing was shown to produce nearly equivalent WM 
performance at all positions in a pilot study with eight participants.  The size of the dots 
increased with increased distance from fixation (.15º diameter near fixation to .3º 
diameter at the point farthest from fixation).   
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After a 2000ms retention interval the SWM probe appeared.  The SWM probe 
consisted of a single dot presented at the same position as one of the sample dots, or at 
a position adjacent to a sample dot (50% probability). Participants made one of two key 
presses with their left hand to indicate whether the probe was the same as or different 
from the sample dot positions.  Participants had 3000ms to respond before the display 
cleared and an incorrect response was registered.  The SWM probe remained onscreen 
for 3000ms even if participants responded within that interval.   
In AWM single-task trials, there were no dot positions to memorize for the SWM 
task.  Instead, the SWM display consisted of block dots at each potential location. 
Participants were instructed to expect these trials and that their presence meant that 
they could ignore the SWM task. During the irrelevant SWM probe, participants were 
instructed to respond by pressing either of the two response keys.   
 
AWM Task 
The AWM task consisted of the presentation via headphones of 2, 6, or 10 
consonants spoken in a female voice.  In pilot testing I found that this set size produced 
similar levels of performance to that of the SWM task for set sizes 1, 3, and 5, 
respectively.  The stimuli were presented sequentially at a rate of 300ms per consonant.  
Note that stimulus presentation time ranged from 600ms (set size 2) to 3000ms (set size 
10).  To control presentation time across set size, the inter-task interval ranged from 
600ms (set size 10) to 3000ms (set size 2) for a total of 3600ms from the onset of the 
AWM sample to the onset of the SWM sample.  During the AWM retention interval 
participants performed the SWM task (5800ms).  The AWM probe followed the SWM 
probe and involved the presentation of a consonant that was the same or different from 
the auditory sample (50% probability).  Participants made one of two key presses with 
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their right hand to indicate whether the probe was the same as or different from the 
sample.  Participants had 3000ms to respond before an incorrect response was 
registered.   
In SWM single-task trials, the auditory sample consisted of the presentation of 
the vowel E to indicate that there was no AWM load.  Participants were instructed to 
expect these trials and to ignore the AWM task during them. During the task-irrelevant 
AWM probe participants were instructed to respond by pressing either of the two 
response keys.   
 
Results 
 To minimize confusion, I reserve the term set size to refer the number of stimuli 
for the currently analyzed task and the term load for the number of stimuli in the other 
task.  For example, for SWM performance I will discuss the impact of SWM set size and 
AWM load.  The following analyses are on the capacity (K) data. Note that there were no 
qualitative differences in the analysis of variance (ANOVA) results between K and 
change detection accuracy.  The advantage of examining K values is that it allows us to 
determine whether the single-task set sizes tested were sufficiently high to exhaust 
capacity.  The K results for all six experiments are shown in Figure 2.  The percent 
correct results are shown in Figure 3.   
 
Measuring Capacity 
 Change detection accuracy for the auditory and spatial WM tasks was entered 
into Cowan’s (2001) K formula (K = [hit rate – false alarm rate]N) to measure the number 
of items stored for each task in each condition (Pashler, 1988; Cowan, 2001; Cowan, 
Johnson, & Saults, 2005). Single-task K values for intermediate set sizes were higher 
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than for low set sizes in both conditions [paired t-tests; AWM task, t(16) = 10.5, p < .001; 
SWM task, t(16) = 2.92, p = .01] suggesting that the low set size was insufficient to 
exhaust WM capacity.  Importantly, there was no difference in K scores between high 
and intermediate set sizes, [AWM task, t(16) = 1.27, p = .22; SWM task, t(16) =.94, p = 
.36] suggesting that participant’s auditory and spatial WM capacity was  exhausted at 
intermediate and high set sizes.  Thus, a failure to find dual-task costs cannot be 
attributable to insufficient task demands.   
 
SWM performance 
 K values for the SWM task (Figure 2A top) were analyzed with a 4 (AWM load) x 
3 (SWM set size) within-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of SWM set size, 
F(2, 48) = 2.72, p < .05, no main effect of AWM load, F(3, 32) = .93, p = .43, and a 
marginal interaction, F(6, 96) = 1.97, p = .06.   
 
AWM performance 
 K values for the AWM task (Figure 2A bottom) were analyzed with a 4 (SWM 
load) x 3 (AWM set size) within-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of AWM set 
size, F(2, 48) = 18.51, p <  .001, no main effect of SWM load, F(3, 32) = .44, p = .73, and 
no interaction, F(6, 96) =.76, p = .64.  
 
Analysis excluding set size 1 
 The prior analyses show no main effect of secondary task load on performance.  
However, one concern is that statistical power may have been reduced by including set 
size 1 trials. Performance on those trials may have been near ceiling (accuracy in single-
task trials with only 1 item averaged across auditory and visual tasks was 92.6%), thus 
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lowering variability.  In the following analysis, responses for stimulus displays with only 
one item were excluded to potentially increase the power of the ANOVA analyses.  This 
analysis showed no effect of AWM load on SWM performance, F(3, 32) = 2.1, p = .16, 
and no interaction between SWM set size and AWM load, F(3, 32) = 1.36, p = .26.  
Similarly, there was no effect of SWM load an AWM performance, F(3, 32) = .52, p = .52, 
and no interaction between AWM set size and SWM load, F(3, 32) = .9, p = .45.  Thus, 
the current study shows no evidence for cross-modal interference in WM even when the 
analysis excludes responses for displays of only 1 item.   
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Figure 2:  Capacity data (K) for the AWM (above) and SWM (below) tasks for Expts. 1-6 (represented in panels 1-6, 
respectively) as a function of task set size and secondary task load.  Error bars represent between-subject standard error 
of the mean.   
 21 
Figure 3: Percent correct for the AWM (above) and SWM (below) tasks for Expts. 1-6 (represented in panels 1-6, 
respectively) as a function of task set size and secondary task load.  Error bars represent between-subject standard error 
of the mean.   
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Discussion 
For both AWM and SWM, K values were strongly affected by task set size, 
suggesting that the tasks were sufficiently demanding to exhaust processing capacity.  
However, there was no evidence for dual-task costs for either task. Even at the highest 
secondary task load WM performance is similar to that in the single-task condition.  
These results differ from previous studies that found significant costs when auditory and 
visual tasks are paired at high load (Fougnie & Marois, 2006; Cocchini et al., 2002; 
Scarborough, 1972).  However, before I can conclude that the present study is evidence 
against the presence of a domain-general WM store, several concerns need to be 
addressed: 
1) Will these findings generalize for different auditory WM stimuli? 
2) Will the lack of interference effects occur even if an additional task ties up 
participants’ articulatory loop? 
3) Can these results be explained by proposing that long lasting sensory traces 
of the stimuli eliminate the need for storage in WM (Saults & Cowan, 2007)? 
The following studies address these concerns and also show that the lack of costs 
between auditory and spatial stimuli is highly replicable in this paradigm.   
 
Experiment 2 
A possible explanation for the lack of dual-task costs could be that the use of a 
verbal WM load may allow participants to rehearse the AWM stimuli using the 
articulatory loop proposed by Baddeley (Baddeley, 1986).  In Expts. 2 and 3 I ask 
whether stimuli that cannot be maintained in the articulatory loop show more evidence of 
dual-task costs.   
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Experiment 2 combines SWM with an AWM task for non-verbalizable 
synthesized sounds.  A set of 12 sounds were generated to be as distinct from each 
other as possible and to be difficult to vocalize (to listen to these sounds visit 
http://sites.google.com/site/darylfougnie/audwmexamples). In a pilot study with ten 
participants I found that set sizes of 1, 3, and 5 sounds produced the same pattern of K 
as set sizes of 2, 6, and 10 for verbal WM in Expt. 1.   
 
Methods 
Participants 
Sixteen young adults participated for course credit or monetary reward.  
 
AWM task 
An AWM task for 1, 3, or 5 non-verbalizable sounds (out of 12) replaced the 
verbal WM task from Expt. 1.  The sounds were 300ms in duration and were presented 
at a rate of 500ms per item.  Total stimulus presentation time lasted between 500ms (set 
size 1) and 2500ms (set size 5), and was followed by an inter-task interval (duration 
between offset of auditory presentation and onset of SWM sample) that varied between 
2000ms (set size 5) and 4000ms (set size 1) such that the SWM sample was presented 
4500ms after AWM sample onset.  During the AWM task probe, a single sound was 
presented and participants indicated by key press whether the probe was one of the 
sample items.  As in Expt. 1, during single-task SWM trials the auditory sample was 
replaced by presentation of the vowel E.  Participants completed five blocks of sixty trials 
for a total of 20 trials per condition (up from 16 in Expt. 1).  All other aspects of the study 
were unchanged from Expt. 1.   
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Results 
Single-task capacity 
Single-task K values for intermediate set sizes were higher than for low set sizes 
in both conditions [AWM task, t(15) = 6.73, p < .001; SWM task, t(15) = 4.64, p < .001].  
However, there were no differences in K values between intermediate and high set sizes 
[AWM task, t(15) = .29, p = .78; SWM task, t(15) = .25, p = .80]. This suggests that the 
task loads used were sufficiently demanding to exhaust single-task capacity.   
 
SWM performance 
 K values for the SWM task (Figure 2B top) were analyzed with a 4 (AWM load) x 
3 (SWM set size) within-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of SWM set size, 
F(2, 45) = 8.99, p < .001, no main effect of AWM load, F(3, 30) = .16, p = .93, and no 
interaction, F(6, 90) = .34, p = .92.   
 
AWM performance 
 K values for the AWM task (Figure 2B bottom) were analyzed with a 4 (SWM 
load) x 3 (AWM set size) within-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of AWM set 
size, F(2, 45) = 38.58, p < .001, no main effect of SWM load, F(3, 30) = .94, p = .43, and 
no interaction, F(6, 90) = 1.86, p = .11.  One concern is that the null effect of SWM load 
is driven by performance in the AWM single-task condition, which is surprisingly low.  
Perhaps by mixing single- and dual-task conditions within blocks the single-task trials 
(which were less common) were more difficult because they were unexpected. However, 
there was still no effect of SWM load if single-task trials were excluded, F(2, 30) = 1.16, 
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p = .33, and no interaction, F(6, 90) = 1.71, p = .13.  Indeed, an analysis of dual-task 
performance at the highest AWM set size still found no effect of SWM load (p = .14).   
 
Analysis excluding set size 1 
 An additional analysis was conducted to test whether the lack of load effects was 
influenced by reduced variability at set size 1.  The lack of load effects shown in the full 
ANOVA results were replicated in an ANOVA analysis that excluded set size 1 
conditions. There was no effect of AWM load on SWM performance, F(3, 45) = .15, p = 
.93, and no interaction between SWM set size and AWM load, F(3, 45) = .4, p = .75.  
There was no effect of SWM load an AWM performance, F(3, 45) = .93, p = .44, and no 
interaction between AWM set size and SWM load, F(3, 45) = 2.14, p = .11.  
 
Experiment 3 
No evidence of dual-task costs was observed in the previous study even with 
non-verbal AWM stimuli.  While the sounds for Expt. 2 were difficult to verbalize, 
participants might have associated the sounds with conceptual labels that they could 
articulate.  To further minimize the possibility that the lack of dual-task costs between 
auditory and spatial WM are due to participants being able to rehearse the auditory 
stimuli using a verbal or pre-verbal strategy, the AWM task for Expt. 3 used a set of 
stimuli drawn from a single category—difficult to identify birdcalls from birds not found in 
the United States (to listen to these sounds visit 
http://sites.google.com/site/darylfougnie/audwmexamples).  During debriefing all 
participants were asked whether they recognized the birdcalls.  No participant reported 
that they associated a birdcall with a specific bird.  Thus, performance on this task likely 
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depended on participants memorizing sound characteristics rather than memorizing a 
category label.    
 
Methods 
Ten young adults participated for course credit or monetary reward. The AWM 
task was changed to memorizing 1, 3, or 5 birdcalls (350ms duration, presented every 
500ms) selected from a set of 12 possible birdcalls.  Additionally, single-task trials were 
removed from the design so that participants performed two tasks on all trials.  This was 
done to address concerns that the single-task conditions were more difficult than dual-
task conditions due to the relatively rare occurrence of single-task trials.  Participants 
performed six blocks of thirty-six trials for a total of 24 trials per condition.   
 
Results 
Single-task capacity 
In Experiment 3 there were no single-task conditions.  Therefore, to test whether 
the tasks used were sufficient to exhaust WM capacity I compared K values as a 
function of task set size during low load. K values for intermediate set sizes were higher 
than for low set sizes in both conditions [AWM task, t(9) = 2.23, p = .05; AWM task, t(15) 
= 3.87, p < .005].  A comparison of differences in K values between intermediate and 
high set sizes revealed no difference for the AWM task, t(9) = .12, p = .91, and a trend 
towards lower capacity at high than intermediate set sizes for the SWM, t(9) = -2.0, p = 
.08. This is consistent with previous studies that have found smaller K values at high 
than low set sizes (e.g. Rouder, et al., 2008).  There have been several proposals to 
account for why K may decline at large set sizes.  Rouder et al. (2008) suggested that 
participants might feel intimidated by large set sizes. Alternatively, performance could be 
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limited, in part, by mutually suppressive interactions between WM representations 
(Johnson, Spencer, Luck, & Schöner, 2009) and mutual inhibition increases at higher set 
sizes.  Regardless of why SWM Ks decline at the highest set size, the results suggest 
that the task loads used were sufficiently demanding to exhaust capacity.   
 
SWM performance 
 K values for the SWM task (Figure 2C top) were analyzed with a 3 (AWM load) x 
3 (SWM set size) within-subjects ANOVA. There was a main effect of SWM set size, F(2, 
18) = 7.1, p < .005, a main effect of AWM load, F(2, 18) = 15.91, p < .005, and an 
interaction, F(4, 36) = 3.6, p = .01.  Thus, unlike the previous studies, the present study 
finds evidence that AWM load influences SWM K values.  Was this effect consistent with 
competition for a shared capacity?  Interference between tasks should reduce K values 
as task load is increased.  However, SWM K values during high auditory load were 
greater than during low auditory load [linear contrast, t(9) =  -2.55, p = .03]. The pattern 
of interference is not consistent with shared capacity across tasks.   
 
AWM performance 
 K values for the AWM task (Figure 2C bottom) were analyzed with a 3 (SWM 
load) x 3 (AWM set size) within-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of AWM set 
size, F(2, 18) = 10.44, p < .005, no main effect of SWM load, F(2, 18) = .71, p = .51, and 
no interaction, F(4, 36) = .34, p = .85. Thus, there is no evidence that SWM load 
interferes with AWM K values.   
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Analysis excluding set size 1 
 Similar results were found when set size 1 was not included.  There was an effect 
of AWM load on SWM performance, F(2, 18) = 18.08, p < .001, but it went in the 
opposite direction than predicted.  There was no interaction between set size and load, 
F(2, 18) = 1.72, p = .20.  There was no evidence of SWM load affecting AWM 
performance, F(2, 18) = .72, p =.50, and no interaction between AWM set size and SWM 
load, F(2, 18) = .28, p = .76.  
 
Experiment 4 
 To further eliminate the possibility that the lack of interference between the 
auditory and SWM tasks was due to participants verbalizing the auditory stimuli, in the 
current study participants were required to overtly repeat the word the at a rate of 4Hz.  
This articulatory suppression task should reduce participants’ ability to verbalize stimuli.   
 
Methods 
Twenty young adults participated for course credit or monetary reward.  One 
participant’s data were not included in the analysis because they were not performing 
the articulatory suppression task on all trials, leaving 19 participants for analysis.  This 
experiment was similar to Expt. 3 except that participants were instructed to perform 
articulatory suppression while the SWM lines were shown on screen.  The SWM lines 
were removed during the 1000ms ITI and appeared 1000ms prior to the AWM sample.  
 
Results 
Single-task capacity 
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To test whether the tasks used were sufficient to exhaust WM capacity, I 
compared K values as a function of task set size during low load. K values for 
intermediate set sizes were higher than for low set sizes in both conditions [AWM task, 
t(18) = 4.41, p < .001; SWM task, t(18) = 6.57, p < .001].  A comparison of differences in 
K values between intermediate and high set sizes revealed no differences for the AWM 
task, t(18) = .04, p = .97, and evidence for lower capacity at high versus intermediate set 
sizes for the SWM task, t(18) = -2.75, p = .02 This suggests that the task loads used 
were sufficiently demanding to exhaust capacity.   
 
SWM performance 
 K values for the SWM task (Figure 2D top) were analyzed with a 3 (AWM load) x 
3 (SWM set size) within-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of SWM set size, 
F(2, 36) = 25.73, p < .001, a main effect of AWM load, F(2, 36) = 3.27, p = .05, but no 
interaction, F(4, 72) = .88, p = .48.  A linear contrast analysis was run to determine 
whether SWM Ks were greater during low AWM load than high AWM load. However, the 
results showed a non-significant pattern of greater Ks at higher secondary task load, 
t(18) = -1.11, p = .27.  Thus, there is no evidence that increased AWM load competes 
with SWM capacity.   
 
AWM performance 
 K values for the AWM task (Figure 2D bottom) were analyzed with a 3 (SWM 
load) x 3 (AWM set size) within-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of AWM set 
size, F(2, 36) = 18.44, p < .001, a main effect of SWM load, F(2, 36) = 3.26, p =.05, and 
a marginally significant interaction, F(4, 72) = 2.42, p = .06. A linear contrast analysis 
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found that AWM Ks were not greater during low AWM load than high AWM load, t(18) = 
1.5, p = .14.   
 
Analysis excluding set size 1 
 The full ANOVA results provide little evidence that WM performance depends on 
the load of a second task in a different modality.  To provide a more sensitive test, an 
additional ANOVA analysis was conducted that excluded set size 1.  There was a 
significant effect of AWM load on SWM performance, F(2, 36) = 3.37, p = .05, but no 
interaction between set size and load, F(2, 36) = .26, p = .78.  There was also a marginal 
effect of SWM load on AWM performance, F(2, 36) = 3.12, p = .06, but no interaction 
between AWM set size and SWM load, F(2, 36) = 2.21, p = .12.  Note that while both 
main effects of load found significant or nearly significant results, these effects went in 
opposing directions.  For the SWM task, performance in high AWM load conditions was 
higher than in low AWM load conditions.  In contrast, for the AWM task performance in 
low SWM load condition was higher than in high SWM load conditions.  Overall, the 
present data does not find support for greater interference between SWM and AWM 
stimuli during articulatory suppression.   
 
Experiment 5 
 In the previous studies I found no evidence for interference between spatial and 
AWM tasks, and found that these results generalized across three different AWM tasks.  
This is in contrast to the results of a paper by Saults and Cowan (2007) that claimed that 
dual-task costs between auditory and visual WM tasks signify that the two tasks share 
the same capacity-limited storage system.  One possible explanation for this 
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discrepancy is that performance in my experiments may be assisted by long-lasting 
sensory memory for auditory and visual stimuli. Sensory memory, which is distinct from 
WM, refers to the temporary persistence of sensory information after a stimulus has 
ceased. It is characterized as having an extremely large capacity but a brief duration. 
Typical estimates of the duration of sensory memory for visual information (iconic 
memory; 200-300ms) or auditory information (echoic memory; 1-2s) are too brief to 
assist performance in typical WM tasks (Averbach & Coriell, 1961; Broadbent, 1958; 
Crowder, 1982; Crowder & Morton, 1969; Rostron, 1974; Sperling, 1960). However, 
Cowan has argued that there are two phases of sensory storage: an initial transient 
phase with unlimited capacity, and a capacity-limited phase lasting several seconds 
(Cowan, 1988, 1995).  It is possible that the WM tasks could be performed by this longer 
lasting component of sensory memory.  This possibility was tested in Expts. 5 and 6.  In 
Expt. 5, the retention interval for the SWM task (during which participants were also 
storing the AWM sample) was increased from 2000ms to 9000ms such that it would 
exceed even the longer estimates of sensory memory proposed by Cowan (1988, 1995).   
 
Methods 
Eleven young adults participated for course credit or monetary reward.  This 
experiment was similar to Expt. 2 except that the retention duration for the SWM task 
was increased from 2000ms to 9000ms.  As in Expt. 3 single-task trials were removed 
and participants performed six blocks of thirty-six trials for a total of 24 trials per 
condition.   
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Results 
Single-task capacity 
To test whether the tasks used were sufficient to exhaust WM capacity, I 
compared K values as a function of task set size during low load. Surprisingly, AWM K 
values for intermediate AWM set sizes were not higher than for low AWM set sizes, t(10) 
= .64, p = .54. SWM K values for intermediate SWM set sizes were higher than for low 
SWM set sizes, t(10) = 3.01, p = .01. A comparison of differences in K values between 
intermediate and high set sizes revealed no differences for both tasks [AWM task, t(10) 
= 1.80, p = .11; SWM task, t(10) = .11, p < .91]. This suggests that the task loads used 
were sufficiently demanding to exhaust capacity.   
 
SWM performance 
 K values for the SWM task (Figure 2E top) were analyzed with a 3 (AWM load) x 
3 (SWM set size) within-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of SWM set size, 
F(2, 20) = 22.11, p = .002, no main effect of AWM load, F(2, 20) = 1.45, p = .26, and no 
interaction, F(4, 40) = 1.88, p = .13.  Thus, there is no evidence of AWM load interfering 
with SWM capacity.   
 
AWM performance 
 K values for the AWM task (Figure 2E bottom) were analyzed with a 3 (SWM 
load) x 3 (AWM set size) within-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of AWM set 
size, F(2, 20) = 4.79, p = .02, no main effect of SWM load, F(2, 20) = 1.9, p = .17, and an 
interaction, F(2, 20) = 4.06, p = .007.  The interaction appears to be driven by the 
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unusual pattern of K across set size in the medium SWM load condition.  If this level of 
load is removed, the interaction between AWM set size and SWM load is no longer 
significant (p = .25).  The present data provide no evidence that SWM load interferes 
with AWM capacity.   
 
Analysis excluding set size 1 
 Analyses that exclude set size 1 also show no main effect of secondary task load 
on performance. There was no effect of AWM load on SWM performance, F(2, 20) = 
1.19, p = .30, and no interaction between set size and load, F(2, 20) = 2.26, p = .13.  
There was no effect of SWM load on AWM performance, F(2, 20) = 2.45, p = .11.  
However, as in the full ANOVA, there was an interaction between AWM set size and 
SWM load, F(2, 20) = 4.37, p = .03.  Again, this interaction is likely driven by the unusual 
pattern of K as set size is increased in the medium SWM load condition.   
 
Experiment 6 
 As a further control to remove potential contributions from sensory memory in the 
task, I used visual and auditory masks similar to that employed by Saults and Cowan 
(2007) to disrupt any echoic or iconic sensory traces of the sample displays.   
 
Methods 
Fifteen young adults participated for course credit or monetary reward.  This 
experiment was similar to Expt. 3 except that auditory and visual sensory masks were 
presented during the SWM retention interval to eliminate sensory traces of the auditory 
and SWM samples.  The masks were presented 1000ms after the offset of the SWM 
display.   The SWM mask consisted of the presentation of white dots at each potential 
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stimulus location (12 dots on each line) for 1000ms.  For the AWM mask the 12 possible 
auditory stimuli were combined into one sound (350ms) that was played twice during the 
1000ms mask interval.  A 2000ms retention interval separated mask presentation and 
the presentation of the SWM probe.   
 
Results 
Single-task capacity 
To test whether the tasks used were sufficient to exhaust WM capacity, I 
compared K values as a function of task set size during low load.  There was a 
marginally significant trend towards higher AWM K values for intermediate AWM set 
sizes than for low AWM set sizes, t(14) = 1.80, p = .10.  SWM K values for intermediate 
SWM set sizes were higher than for low SWM set sizes, t(14) = 4.77, p < .001. A 
comparison of differences in K values between intermediate and high set sizes revealed 
no differences for the AWM task, t(14) = 1.39, p = .19.  For the SWM task I found higher 
capacity for intermediate than high set sizes, t(14) = 3.97, p = .001. This suggests that 
the task loads used were sufficiently demanding to exhaust capacity.   
 
SWM performance 
 K values for the SWM task (Figure 2F top) were analyzed with a 3 (AWM load) x 
3 (SWM set size) within-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of SWM set size, 
F(2, 28) = 12.02, p < .001, no main effect of AWM load, F(2, 28) = 1.67, p = .21, and no 
interaction, F(4, 56) = 1.12, p = .36.  There is no evidence of AWM load interfering with 
SWM capacity.   
 
 
 35 
AWM performance 
 K values for the AWM task (Figure 2F bottom) were analyzed with a 3 (SWM 
load) x 3 (AWM set size) within-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of AWM set 
size, F(2, 28) = 7.33, p = .003, no main effect of SWM load, F(2, 28) = .86, p =.43, and 
no interaction, F(4, 56) = .47, p = .76.  The present data provide no evidence that SWM 
load interferes with AWM capacity.   
 
Analysis excluding set size 1 
 As in the full ANOVA, an additional ANOVA analysis that excluded set size 1 also 
found no main effects of secondary task load and no interactions between load and set 
size. There was no effect of AWM load on SWM performance, F(2, 28) = 1.69, p = .20, 
and no interaction, F(2, 28) = .98, p = .39.  There was also no effect of SWM load on 
AWM performance, F(2, 28) = .60, p = .56, and no interaction, F(2, 28) = 55, p = .58.  
 
Discussion of Experiment 5 and 6 
Expts. 5 and 6 tested the possibility that the lack of interference between AWM 
and SWM tasks was due to the use of sensory memory.  In Expt. 5, the retention interval 
was increased to be longer than any estimate of the duration of sensory memory. In 
Expt. 6 sensory masks were presented to disrupt information from the sample stored in 
sensory buffers.  Neither study found evidence for interference between AWM and 
SWM.  Thus, the lack of interference between the two tasks cannot be explained by a 
role of sensory memory, inconsistent with Saults and Cowan (2007).   
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Figure 4: Task accuracy for the AWM (top) 
and SWM (bottom) tasks pooled across 
Expts. 1-6 (n=88).   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Task accuracy for the AWM (top) 
and SWM (bottom) tasks pooled across 
Expts. 1-6 (n=88).   
 
 
 
Pooling the data across the six studies 
 In six studies I found no evidence of dual-task costs between AWM and SWM.  
Might these have lacked the power to detect small but significant interference between 
tasks? To provide the most sensitive test for interference, I pooled the results of all 
studies (for a total of 88 participants) and examined the effect of secondary task load on 
task performance.  Since experiments 3-6 did not include single-task trials, single-task 
conditions were not included.  Additionally, since the set size varied across studies and 
K values scale with set size, the analysis is restricted to accuracy.   
 
 
 
 
SWM performance 
 SWM accuracy (Figure 4 top) was analyzed with a 3 (AWM load) x 3 (SWM set 
size) between-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of SWM set size, F(2, 174) = 
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393.74, p < .001, η2 = .38, no main effect of AWM load, F(2, 174) = 1.68, p = .20, η2 = 
.08, and no interaction, F(4, 348) = 1.04, p = .30.  Pooling across all studies, there is no 
evidence of AWM load interfering with SWM capacity.   
 
AWM performance 
 AWM accuracy (Figure 4 bottom) was analyzed with a 3 (SWM load) x 3 (AWM 
set size) between-subjects ANOVA.  There was a main effect of SWM set size, F(2, 174) 
= 232.63, p < .001, η2 = .35, no main effect of AWM load, F(2, 174) = 1.37, p = .26, η2 = 
.11.  There was a significant interaction, F(4, 348) = 3.58, p = .002.  As with SWM 
performance, pooling across all six studies provided no evidence of dual-task costs.   
 
Analysis excluding set size 1 
 The pooled analysis provides a powerful test for whether there is competition 
between auditory and spatial stimuli for storage in WM. However, it is possible that a 
significant effect of secondary task load might have been observed except that the lack 
of variability for set size 1 reduced the power of the statistical test.  To show that this is 
not the case, an additional ANOVA analysis was performed that excluded set size 1.   
For SWM performance, there was a main effect of SWM set size, F(1, 87) = 16.73, p < 
.001, no main effect of AWM load, F(2, 174) = 1.97, p = . 14, and a marginally significant 
interaction, F(2, 174) = 2.26, p = .08.  For AWM performance, there was a main effect of 
AWM set size, F(1, 87) = 5.41, p < .001, no main effect of SWM load, F(2, 174) = .29, p 
= .88, and a significant interaction, F(2, 174) = 2.89, p = .04.  
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Bayesian tests for accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis 
 None of the six studies I conducted, nor the pooled data from those experiments, 
reveal any evidence of competition between auditory and spatial WM loads.  These 
results are difficult to reconcile with the existence of an amodal WM system that has a 
limited capacity and can store information regardless of the modality (Baddeley, 2000; 
Cowan, 1995, 2006; Fougnie & Marois, 2006; Saults & Cowan, 2007).  However, the 
evidence against an amodal store is a failure to reject the null hypothesis that auditory 
and spatial loads do not interfere. Traditional statistical tests using t tests and F tests do 
not allow for the statement of evidence for the null hypothesis.  Fortunately, an 
alternative statistical test has been developed using Bayes factor analysis that allows 
one to state a preference for the null or alternative hypothesis (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, 
Morey, Iverson, 2009).  However, use of the Bayes-factor is not possible in a factorial 
design.  To provide the strongest case for the alternative hypothesis (that secondary 
task load effects primary task performance) I consider whether there is an effect of load 
(comparing low and high load) at performance at the highest set size.  The t value for the 
effect of AWM load on SWM performance (t = -.92) corresponds to a Bayes Factor of 
8.10, suggesting that the null hypothesis was about eight times more probable than the 
alternative hypothesis.  Similarly, the t value for the effect of SWM load on AWM 
performance (t = .88) corresponds to a Bayes Factor of 7.84.  These results strongly 
support the null hypothesis.  Similar results are found if all set sizes are included, or if 
only intermediate and high set sizes are included.   
 
Discussion of Expts. 1-6 
 The results of Expts. 1-6 are the first comprehensive examination of dual-task 
costs between AWM and SWM to find no evidence of interference between the tasks.  
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While this conclusion is based on null results, the large number of participants included 
in these studies and the high task loads involved suggest that if there is any potential for 
interference between these tasks it is small and therefore not consistent with the idea of 
a domain-general storage system (Cowan, 2001, 2006; Saults & Cowan, 2007).   
 Why did the present study find no evidence for interference across auditory and 
visual tasks in contrast to previous studies (Cocchini et al., 2002; Fougnie & Marois, 
2006; Scarborough, 1972)?  One possibility is that previous costs were due to 
representational overlap with the tasks, perhaps because the auditory and visual stimuli 
tapped into a common object WM system (Smith, et al., 1995; Tresch, et al., 1993; 
Ungerleider, et al., 1998; Ventre-Dominey, et al., 2005) or because the visual features 
were re-coded in a propositional or verbal form. Alternatively, costs may have reflected 
interference in the coordination of the tasks due to overloading the central executive 
(Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Duff & Logie, 2001) or to an inability to 
prepare for two tasks versus one task (De Jong & Sweet, 1994).  Neither explanation is 
likely sufficient.  Dual-task costs between spatial and auditory WM tasks have been 
observed (Cocchini et al., 2002). However, it cannot be ruled out that participants did not 
chunk the spatial locations in the displays used by Cocchini and colleagues into a non-
spatial format. Also, past studies have tested for interference between auditory and 
visual WM tasks as a function of task load, rather than simply comparing single- and 
dual-task conditions (Fougnie & Marois, 2006; Morey & Cowan, 2005), but no previous 
study has controlled all of these factors, and each may contribute to producing small 
dual-task costs. 
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Examining the findings of Saults and Cowan (2007) 
 Saults and Cowan (2007) argued that auditory and visual WM tap into the same 
capacity-limited system based on evidence using a dual-task paradigm similar to the 
studies described above.  They suggested that if sensory masks are presented to disrupt 
perceptual traces of sample stimuli then evidence for interference between AWM and 
VWM can be observed, and that such interference is sufficiently large to only be 
accountable by positing that the capacity limit of WM is due to a single shared capacity-
limit between VWM and AWM.  However, this claim was not supported by the results of 
my Expts. 5 and 6.  Why were Saults and Cowan able to observe evidence of complete 
sharing of capacity between visual and auditory WM tasks whereas I was unable to find 
any evidence of dual-task costs?  The answer, I believe, is partially due to the metric 
Saults and Cowan used to measure the amount of dual-task costs.  They compared 
combined dual-task capacity to the higher single-task capacity (maximum capacity 
method).  This analysis method may overestimate costs when there is a large disparity 
in single-task performance, as there was in Saults and Cowan’s task—single-task VWM 
capacity (3.62) was more than twice that of single-task AWM capacity (1.41).  This 
possibility was tested in Expts. 7-9.     
To quantify dual-task costs when there is a large disparity in the single-task 
capacities I propose measuring the reduction in dual-task capacity relative to each task’s 
single-task capacity, i.e. the proportional cost between single- and dual-task conditions.  
This result is averaged across tasks to estimate an aggregate measure of dual-task 
costs, termed ∆K.   
 
! 
"K = (
task1sin gle # task1dual
task1sin gle
+
task2sin gle # task2dual
task2sin gle
) /2  (1) 
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Assuming that both tasks tap into separate resources, ∆K should be zero.  If both tasks 
tap into the same limited-capacity system, ∆K should be 50%, or half of capacity (since 
that same capacity is shared across both tasks).   
In the following experiments, I use a dual-task WM paradigm similar to that of 
Saults and Cowan (2007). Participants had to concurrently maintain two sets of WM 
stimuli: four spoken digits and four colored squares (Expt. 7). To eliminate contributions 
from sensory memory I presented pattern masks, as in Saults and Cowan (2007), during 
the WM retention interval.  Participants completed separate blocks of single-task 
auditory, single-task visual, and dual-task WM trials.  Capacity estimates (Ks) for each 
task were derived from participants’ change detection accuracy.  In Experiments 7 and 8, 
I demonstrate that the maximum capacity method (as used by Saults & Cowan, 2007) is 
modulated by the disparity in single-task capacity, while ∆K is not.  When VWM capacity 
is twice that of AWM capacity, the maximum capacity method finds evidence for a single 
capacity-limit across tasks (Expt. 7).  However, when single-task visual and AWM 
capacity are equivalent, the maximum capacity method shows evidence of inter-modal 
savings - combined dual-task capacity is greater than single-task capacity (Expts. 8a 
and 8b).  The ∆K method found consistent evidence of only small dual-task costs across 
both studies.  These findings reveal a problem with the maximum capacity method: the 
outcome depends on the ratio of single-task performance across tasks.  In contrast, ∆K 
was robust to manipulations of single-task capacity.  The results show that auditory and 
visual WM do not tap into the same limited-capacity process.  
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Experiment 7 
Saults and Cowan (2007) had participants concurrently perform auditory and 
visual WM tasks and found that combined dual-task capacity was not greater than the 
higher single-task capacity.  The goal of Experiment 7 was to replicate their findings 
including the disparity in single-task VWM and AWM capacity. I predicted that the 
maximum capacity method would show no inter-modal savings due to the disparity in 
single-task performance across tasks. If the lack of inter-modal savings in Saults and 
Cowan (2007) is due to the disparity in single-task performance, than ∆K should show 
evidence of inter-modal savings, since ∆K is resilient to differences in single-task 
capacity across tasks (Fougnie & Marois, 2006). 
In the VWM task participants had to remember the color and location of briefly 
presented squares.  Participants are generally able to store 3-4 items in this VWM task 
(Luck & Vogel, Todd & Marois, 2004; Vogel et al., 2001).  For the AWM task, participants 
were presented with four digits, each spoken in a different voice (two distinct male, two 
distinct female voices), and asked to remember the value and speaker identity for each 
digit.  A pilot study with eight participants found that this task had a capacity of about 2 
items, similar to the single-task AWM task used by Saults and Cowan (2007).   
 
Methods 
Participants 
Twelve young adults participated for course credit or monetary reward.   
 
Stimuli 
Colors for the VWM task were drawn from blue, green, red, or yellow without 
replacement.  VWM squares subtended 1.4º and were presented at horizontal and 
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vertical axes positions 2.9º from fixation (Figure 5).  Visual pattern masks (1.4º) were 
formed by presenting a multicolored square (with 4 colored stripes, randomly assigned 
from the VWM color set) at the four VWM locations. Auditory WM stimuli were drawn 
from the digits 0-9 without replacement.  Each digit was randomly assigned a distinct 
voice (from a set of two male and two female voices) with each audio file lasting 300ms. 
Masks for the AWM task were formed by layering the 40 audio files.  The mask sound 
was 300ms in duration, and was presented four times during the 1200ms mask interval.   
 
 
 
 
 
Procedure 
 Prior to the main experiment, participants completed a practice session of 32 
single- and dual-task trials.  In the main experiment, participants performed one single-
task auditory, one single-task visual, and two dual-task blocks, with forty trials in each 
block.  Block order was counter-balanced across participants with the restriction that 
dual-task blocks were performed consecutively.  In single-task trials, both the auditory 
and VWM samples and masks were presented to minimize perceptual differences during 
encoding.  However, only the task-relevant modality was tested. In dual-task trials, 
Figure 5:  a) Trial timeline for Experiment 7.  b) Example stimuli and sensory masks used in Experiments 8a and 8b. 
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participants were tested on either the auditory or visual WM sample.  Since the tested 
modality was assigned on a per trial basis, participants had no way of knowing which 
modality would be tested, and therefore were required to maintain both samples until the 
probe appeared.   
 A trial began with the presentation of a black fixation dot against a gray 
background.  Participants were instructed to keep their gaze centered on fixation for the 
duration of a trial.  Presentation of the WM stimuli began 1000ms after fixation onset. 
Participants heard four digits over headphones spoken at a rate of 300ms/item.  
Concurrent with digit presentation, four colored squares were presented, and remained 
on screen for 1200ms.  A retention interval lasting 2000ms followed WM sample 
presentation.  Auditory and visual masks were presented 400ms into the retention 
interval, with a 1200ms duration.  Following retention, a single-item change detection 
probe was presented. VWM probes were a colored square that was either in the same 
location as it was during the sample, or was shown in one of the other three locations.  
AWM probes were a digit from the sample either spoken in the same voice, or in one of 
the other three voices.  Participants were to indicate whether the probe item exactly 
matched the sample (50% probability), by pressing one of two keys with their right hand.  
Accuracy was stressed and participants were under no time pressure to respond.  VWM 
probes remained onscreen until a response was recorded.  A 200ms ITI period 
separated trials.   
 
Results 
 Task capacity (Figure 6a top) was estimated by measuring K from change 
detection accuracy (Cowan, 2001).  ANOVA analyses were quantitatively the same 
whether K or change detection accuracy was the dependent measure.  I report analyses 
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on K consistent with Saults and Cowan (2007).  K was entered into a within-subjects 
ANOVA with the factors of modality (visual or auditory) and single- or dual-task.  There 
was a main effect of modality, F(1,11) = 55.37, p < .001, with VWM having a higher 
capacity than AWM.  There was also a main effect indicating that single-task trials had 
higher capacity than dual-task trials, F(1,11) = 22.31, p < .001.  There was no interaction 
between modality and single- or dual-task condition, F(1,11) = .29, p = .60. The ANOVA 
results show that AWM capacity was much lower than VWM capacity. Indeed, a paired t-
test found that single-task VWM capacity (3.73) was significantly higher than single-task 
AWM capacity (2.23), t(11) = 8.03, p < .001.   
These results replicate two major aspects of Saults and Cowan (2007). First, in 
this study the single-task capacity for VWM was nearly twice that of single-task AWM 
capacity.  Second, the ANOVA results found clear evidence of dual-task costs. Two 
methods were employed to measure the amount of dual-task costs and determine 
whether they were indicative of a single shared capacity across modalities.   
 
Maximum Capacity Method 
The maximum capacity method tests whether combined auditory and visual dual-
task capacity is greater than the single-task with the higher capacity.  This was not the 
case.  A paired t-test found that combined dual-task capacity (4.11) was not greater than 
single-task visual capacity, t(11) = 1, p = .33.   
 
∆K Method 
Using equation 2 I measured the average percent decrease in each task’s dual-
task capacity relative to its single-task capacity (Fougnie & Marois, 2006). With this 
measure, if two tasks tap into the same capacity-limited process, a ∆K of 50% is 
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expected.  Indeed, a ∆K of 51% is found if equation 1 is applied to the concurrent VWM 
task of Fougnie and Marois (2006). However, the current study shows a ∆K of 34% 
(Figure 6a top) which is significantly lower than 50%, t(11) = 2.37, p = .04. Thus, 
measuring dual-task costs with ∆K reveals significant inter-modal savings.   
 
Discussion 
Significant dual-task costs were observed when participants had to concurrently 
perform an auditory and visual WM task.  Do these costs indicate that a single amodal 
store underlies WM capacity (Cowan, 2001; 2006)?  Two measures were applied to 
quantify the dual-task costs.  The maximum capacity method (Saults & Cowan, 2007) 
found no evidence of inter-modal savings, consistent with the predictions of a single 
shared capacity across modalities.  In contrast, a quantitative measure of dual-task costs 
using the ∆K method found that costs were less than predicted by a single shared 
capacity.  To explain this discrepancy, I propose that the maximum capacity method is a 
biased measure of dual-task costs that overestimates costs when there is a large 
disparity between the single-task capacities of the two tasks.  Critically, this predicts that 
altering single-task capacity to be equivalent across tasks will affect the maximum 
capacity method, but will not affect the ∆K method.  Specifically, I predict that both 
measures will show evidence of inter-modal savings under such conditions. To test this, 
in Experiment 8 the AWM task of Expt. 7 was paired with VWM tasks that had a single-
task capacity similar to the AWM task.  VWM tasks that require storage of complex 
stimuli show reduced change detection performance and lower estimates of capacity 
(Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004).  The explanation for these lower capacity estimates is a 
matter of debate (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007; Barton, Ester, 
& Awh, 2009; Eng, Chen, & Jiang, 2005; Jiang, Shim, & Makovski, 2008; Luria, Sessa, 
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Gotler, Jolicoeur, Dell’Acqua, 2009; Scolari, Vogel, & Awh, 2008).  However, there is 
clear evidence that increasing the complexity of representations reduces VWM accuracy, 
and therefore measured K values.  For example, Alvarez and Cavanagh (2004) found 
that WM capacity for colored squares was 4.4, while capacity for complex polygons was 
2.0. In addition, there is evidence that WM capacity for faces is around two items (Eng, 
et al., 2005; Curby & Gauthier, 2007).  Experiments 8a and 8b paired AWM for digits 
with VWM for polygons and faces, respectively.  
 
Experiment 8a 
Methods 
A separate set of twelve young adults participated for course credit or monetary 
reward.  The color WM task was replaced with a VWM task that required participants to 
memorize the shape of complex polygons. A set of ten eight-sided polygons were 
randomly generated such that their spatial extent did not exceed a 1.6º x 1.6º area.  
Polygons had a solid white color, and were presented against a gray background.  None 
of these polygons resembled any familiar shapes.  Every trial, four random polygons 
were assigned to one of the four VWM locations (see Expt 1) without replacement.  
Participants were instructed to remember the pairing of shape and location.  For VWM 
probes a polygon from the sample array was presented at the correct location, or one of 
the other possible locations (equally likely).  Participants made an unspeeded response 
to indicate whether the shape and location matched.  Visual masks were constructed by 
layering the outline of the ten polygons (Figure 5b), and presenting this stimulus at all 
four VWM locations for the 1200ms mask duration.  In all other respects, this experiment 
was the same as Expt. 7.  
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Figure 6:  Top: WM capacity for AWM (red) and VWM (blue) tasks as a function of single- or dual-task condition for 
Experiments 7, 8a, 8b, and 9, respectively.  The combined dual-task capacity (Comb; purple) was calculated by 
summing each participant’s auditory and visual dual-task WM capacity.  Bottom: Normalized dual-task costs (∆K) for the 
AWM (red) and VWM (blue) tasks were combined to measure average costs (purple).  Normalized costs of 50% would 
represent no inter-modal savings, whereas 0% indicates no interference across modalities.   
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.   
 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
Capacity data (Figure 6b top) was entered into a within-subjects ANOVA with the 
factors of modality (visual or auditory) and single- or dual-task.  There was a marginally 
significant effect of modality, F(1,11) = 3.31, p = .1, with AWM having a higher capacity 
than VWM.  However, this effect appears to be influenced by dual-task performance.  
Indeed, there is no difference in single-task auditory (2.45) and visual (2.22) WM 
capacity (paired t-test, p=.34), suggesting that, unlike Expt. 7, single-task capacity is 
equated in the current study.  The ANOVA revealed that single-task trials had a higher 
capacity than dual-task trials, F(1,11) = 18.76, p = .001.  The interaction between 
modality and single- or dual-task condition was not significant, F(1,11) = .55, p = .47. 
 The maximum capacity method found evidence for inter-modal savings in the 
present study, in contrast to the results of Expt. 7.  Paired t-tests found that combined 
dual-task capacity (3.33) was greater than both auditory and visual single-task capacity 
(p’s < .005). Inter-modal savings were also found when dual-task costs were quantified 
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using ∆K. The ∆K for the current study (Figure 6b bottom, 24%) was significantly lower 
than 50%, t(11) = 3.16, p < .01. As predicted, when single-task WM capacity was 
equated, the maximum capacity method no longer shows evidence for a single shared 
capacity across modalities.  In addition, now the maximum capacity and ∆K methods 
converge in showing evidence of inter-modal savings.  This suggests that ∆K is a more 
reliable measure of dual-task costs since it is less affected by unequal single-task 
capacities.  Additionally, these results suggest that auditory and visual WM tasks tap into 
at least partially dissociable storage systems.   
 Experiment 8a differs from Experiment 7 in two ways:  the capacities for the two 
single-tasks were matched, and the VWM stimulus set involved complex polygons 
instead of colored squares.  An additional experiment was conducted to show that the 
present findings generalize to a different stimulus set.  Experiment 8b uses face stimuli 
for the WM task, as this stimulus set has also been shown to have a capacity of around 
two items (Eng et al., 2005; Curby & Gauthier, 2007).   
 
Experiment 8b 
Methods 
A separate set of eighteen young adults participated for course credit or 
monetary reward.  The VWM stimuli were ten male faces obtained from the Max-Planck 
face database (Troje & Bülthoff, 1996). These images were presented in grayscale, 
against a white background, and subtended 1.6º x 3.2º degrees of visual angle.  Four 
random faces were selected per trial, without replacement, to occupy one of the four 
stimulus locations.  A mask was formed by averaging the luminance values of each pixel 
across the ten face stimuli (Figure 5b).  This mask was presented at each of the four 
stimulus positions for the duration of the 1200ms mask interval.   
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Results and Discussion 
Capacity data (Figure 6c top) was entered into a within-subjects ANOVA with the 
factors of modality (visual or auditory) and single- or dual-task.  There was no main 
effect of modality, F(1,17) =.23, p = .64.  Both single-task auditory and visual WM 
capacity were 1.8 items.  There was a main effect revealing that single-task trials had a 
higher capacity than dual-task trials, F(1,17) = 21.07, p < .001.  The interaction between 
modality and single- or dual-task condition was not significant, F(1,17) = .16, p = .69.   
The maximum capacity method found evidence for inter-modal savings in the 
present study.  Paired t-tests found that combined dual-task capacity (2.51) was greater 
than both single-task auditory and visual WM capacity (both p’s < .01). When dual-task 
costs were quantified with ∆K there was also evidence for inter-modal savings. The ∆K 
for the current study (24%; Figure 6c bottom) was significantly lower than 50%, t(17) = 
2.69, p = .01.  I found similar results in the current study as Experiment 8a, suggesting 
that the present findings generalize across stimulus sets. These results replicate the 
findings of Experiment 8a using a distinct stimulus set. The disparity in results between 
Experiment 7 and 8 is likely due to the change in ratio of single-task capacities, and not 
stimulus-specific factors.  
The dual-task costs reported in the present study are smaller than those 
predicted by a single shared capacity-limit across modalities. However, they are quite 
substantial, and are larger than dual-task costs reported in Expts. 1-6, as well as in other 
previous studies (Cocchini et al., 2002, Morey & Cowan, 2005).  In Expt. 9 I examine one 
potential factor that may determine the magnitude of dual-task costs: the amount of 
processing overlap shared by two tasks (Dutta, Schweickert, Choi, & Proctor, 1995; 
Navon, 1984, Navon & Miller, 1987).  If two sets of stimuli have largely independent 
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storage systems, having to perform both concurrently may still result in large dual-task 
costs if the tasks engage another capacity-limited process. One such candidate 
capacity-limited process is attention (Cowan, 1995), which may be particularly critical 
when a WM task has multiple task-relevant features that participants may try to bind 
together and store in an integrated fashion (Fougnie & Marois, 2009A).  In Expts. 1 and 
2 participants were required to remember color-location and digit-voice pairings.  
Similarly, in Saults and Cowan’s (2007) experiments colors and digits could appear more 
than once in a WM sample, and therefore participants would be encouraged to maintain 
color-location and digit-voice bindings in order to identify all potential changes (Vogel et 
al., 2001). Therefore, it is possible that dual-task costs in these studies may have been 
influenced by limited attentional resources. To test this, here I measure the amount of 
dual-task costs for WM tasks for a single feature and therefore neither encourage nor 
require a binding of features in stored representations.  The VWM task involves WM for 
the color of squares presented sequentially at fixation and the AWM task involves WM 
for the pitch of sequentially presented tones.  WM stimuli differed from each other only in 
the task-relevant feature, eliminating any potential benefit for storing bound 
representations. A separate pilot study on eight participants found that single-task 
capacity for the auditory and visual WM tasks was greater than four, but no higher than 
six.  Therefore, the set size for each task was increased from four to six.  I predict that 
there will be significantly less dual-task costs in the current study than in Expt. 7.  
 
Experiment 9 
Methods 
A separate set of twelve young adults participated for course credit or monetary 
reward.  The VWM stimuli were six colored squares (1.4º) presented sequentially at 
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fixation for 300ms/item.  Sample display colors were randomly selected from blue, 
orange, purple, brown, dark green, black, white, yellow, light blue, pink, light green, or 
red without replacement.  The study used multi-colored pattern masks, as in Expt. 7, 
except that the masks had 12 distinctly colored stripes.  Participants were to indicate 
whether the single-item VWM probe was the same color as one of the sample items 
(50% likelihood).  The AWM task consisted of a series of six tones (300ms) presented 
sequentially over headphones.  The tones were selected without replacement from a set 
of 12 possible tones with frequencies varying from 220-1100 hz, in 80 hz steps.  A tone 
mask was formed by layering all tone stimuli and was presented for the entire 1200ms 
mask interval. Participants were to indicate whether the probe tone was the same 
frequency as one of the sample items (50% likelihood).  Note that the auditory and visual 
samples were presented concurrently, such that a colored square was on screen for the 
duration of a single tone stimulus.  In other respects, this study was the same as Expt. 7.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Capacity data (Figure 6d top) was entered into a within-subjects ANOVA with the 
factors of modality (visual or auditory) and single- or dual-task.  There was a marginally 
significant effect of modality, F(1,11) =.84, p = .07.  However, this effect appears to be 
influenced by performance in dual-task conditions.  Indeed, there is no difference 
between single-task auditory (3.53) and single-task visual (3.6) WM capacity (paired t-
test, p = .89). Therefore, the auditory and visual WM tasks were matched for capacity.   
There was no evidence for dual-task costs, unlike Experiments 7 and 8, as the 
ANOVA revealed that single-task trials did not have a higher capacity than dual-task 
trials, F(1,11) = 2.6, p = .13.  There was also a significant interaction between modality 
and single- or dual-task condition, F(1,11) = 4.8, p = .05, driven by the fact that while 
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auditory and visual single-task performance was equivalent, there was a difference in 
auditory (2.4) and visual (3.8) dual-task performance.  
 The maximum capacity method found evidence for inter-modal savings in the 
present study.  Paired t-tests found that combined dual-task capacity (6.18) was greater 
than both auditory and visual single-task capacity, both p’s < .005. Inter-modal savings 
were also found when dual-task costs were quantified using the ∆K measure. The ∆K for 
current study (Figure 6d bottom; 5%) was significantly lower than 50%, t(11) = 5.05, p < 
.001 Indeed, since ∆K was not significantly above zero, t(11) = .49, p =.64, and the 
ANOVA results found no difference between single- and dual-task capacity, there is no 
evidence of dual-task costs in the present study. 
It cannot be known for certain that removing the need to store bound 
representations can eliminate interference between a visual and an auditory WM task 
since the current results are a null finding which may have reached significance with a 
larger sample size.  Note though that a Bayesian analysis applied to the test of whether 
∆K is greater than zero (t = .49) found that the null hypothesis was 4.16 times more likely 
than the alternate hypothesis (Rouder et al., 2009).  Additionally, I can conclude that 
there are significantly less dual-task costs in the current study relative to Experiment 7 
(an independent samples t-test on ∆K values across studies found that ∆K was 
significantly lower in the current study; t(22) = 2.63, p = .01).  Since the main distinction 
between these studies was the requirement to form and maintain integrated 
representations in Experiment 7, this suggests that the interference between auditory 
and visual arrays in that study may have been influenced by an attentional cost in the 
maintenance of feature bindings (Fougnie & Marois, 2009A; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002).  
Thus, caution is necessary in the use of a dual-task paradigm to assess interference 
between auditory and visual WM loads. Cross-modal costs may be overestimated if the 
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tasks overlap in the attentional requirements of maintaining bound representations.  
 
Chapter II Discussion 
 Together, the results of Expts. 1-9 provide strong support for the proposal that WM 
is comprised of modality-specific stores (Baddeley, 1986; Cocchini, et al. 2002; 
Scarborough, 1972) and are inconsistent with a domain-general view of WM.  In the first 
six studies, no costs were observed between an auditory and spatial WM task even 
when the set size of each task was beyond task capacity.  These results could not be 
explained by the use of an articulatory rehearsal strategy or by persisting sensory traces 
of the stimuli.  These results were quite surprising, as past studies, including research I 
had previously conducted, had always found dual-task costs between auditory and visual 
WM arrays at high load.  A goal of the current studies was to design tasks that would 
overlap as little as possible in representational content and to assess dual-task costs 
independent of executive and task preparation loads introduced with a dual-task design.  
Specifically, the current studies used a visuospatial WM task where the shape formed by 
the spatial stimuli was not informative.  By pairing a spatial WM task with a WM task for 
auditory object features I attempted to pair very distinct tasks to provide the best test for 
a domain-general WM system.  Additionally, dual-task costs in these studies were 
assessed by examining dual-task costs as secondary task load is increased, rather than 
simply comparing single- and dual-task conditions.   
 It is difficult for any WM model with a contribution from domain-general sources to 
account for these data (Baddeley, 2000; Cowan, 2006; McElree, 2001; Oberauer, 2002).  
If a domain-general source of WM capacity exists, why was it not contributing to 
performance in the tested tasks?  I conclude that the current findings favor models of 
WM in which capacity is determined by modality-specific storage systems (Baddeley, 
 55 
1986; Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Cocchini et al., 2001; Duff & Logie, 2001; Scarborough, 
1972) or where performance is limited by content-specific interference (Dutta, et al., 
1995; Navon & Miller, 1987; Oberauer & Kliegl, 2001, 2006).   
 These results stand in stark contrast to a recent finding arguing that auditory and 
visual stimuli compete for a single shared WM capacity (Saults & Cowan, 2007).  
Experiments 7-9 explored the cause of the discrepancy between this finding and the 
current studies.  The results of these experiments suggest that Saults and Cowan’s 
study overestimates dual-task costs when there is a large disparity between single-task 
capacities.  These findings argue for the adoption of measures that are resilient to 
differences in single-task capacity across tasks.  One such measure, ∆K, calculates the 
percent decrease in dual-task performance relative to each task’s single-task 
performance.  Adoption of this measure requires the assumption that dual-task costs will 
scale with the size of a task’s single-task capacity.  Under this assumption, normalizing 
dual-task costs to each task’s single-task capacity weakens the influence of capacity 
differences across tasks.  This helps to alleviate the issue of task-tradeoffs.  Otherwise, 
if participants allocate more resources to the task with the higher single-task capacity, 
dual-task costs will be reduced, whereas they will be exaggerated if participants allocate 
more resources to the task with the lower capacity. 
 Overall, the data of Experiments 7-9 are consistent with the results of Expts. 1-6 
and provide further support for domain-specific WM systems, as there was no evidence 
for dual-task costs (Expt. 9) when the need to use attention to maintain feature bindings 
was eliminated.  The source of independent capacity for auditory and visuospatial 
information may be distinct neural regions in prefrontal or association cortex specialized 
for maintaining visual or auditory representations in working memory (Gruber & von 
Cramon, 2001, 2003; Rämä & Courtney, 2005; Romanski & Goldman-Rakic, 2002; 
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Schumacher et al., 1996; Smith, Jonides, & Koeppe, 1996).  Perhaps more likely, 
modality-specific WM representations may be maintained by sustained activity in the 
sensory areas that encode the to-be-remembered information (Harrison & Tong, 2009; 
Serences, et al., 2009). For example, Serences and colleagues demonstrated that the 
color or orientation of gabors held in WM could be decoded from fMRI activity patterns in 
area V1.  Sensory-recruitment during WM would help explain the lack of dual-task costs, 
since perception of auditory and visual stimuli engage separate cortical regions.  
 The present results are difficult to reconcile with theories that suggest the source of 
maintenance in WM is mediated by a top-down bias from amodal regions in pre-frontal 
cortex (Duncan, 1994).  Instead the results support the view that storage in WM can 
happen in the absence of top-down signals (Washburn & Astur, 1998).  
Neurocomputational models of WM (Hopfield, 1982; Amit, Brunel, Tsodyks, 1994), 
based on the possibility that WM representations represent recurrent activity in cell 
assemblies (Hebb, 1949), demonstrate that such self-sustaining representations are 
possible and can be instantiated in the brain.   
 In conclusion, my studies demonstrate that performance in WM tasks is not due to 
a monolithic WM store, and that theories need to account for the distinct capacities of 
auditory and visuospatial tasks.  These findings are not easily accommodated by 
proposals suggesting that attention is the source that constrains WM capacity.  To 
account for the findings, one could suggest that independent capacities for auditory and 
visual WM are mediated by independent capacities for auditory and visual attention. In 
the next chapter I explore the degree to which capacity limits in perceptual attention are 
common or distinct across capacities.  Is there a single shared capacity responsible for 
processing perceptual information, irrespective of the stimulus modality?   Are there 
completely distinct perceptual processing resources for auditory and visual stimuli?   
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CHAPTER III 
 
ARE THERE SEPARATE CAPACITIES FOR  
AUDITORY AND VISUAL PERCEPTUAL ATTENTION? 
 
Motivation for dual-task tracking studies 
 There is more information in the environment than we can attend to and process 
at any given moment. For example, if participants are required to respond to two visual 
objects presented concurrently under time pressure, they can only report properties of 
one stimulus accurately (Bonnel & Miller, 1994; Norman & Bobrow, 1975; Sperling & 
Dosher, 1986).  Such findings illustrate a limit in perceptual processing, here termed 
perceptual attention. Does this limit in perceptual processing reflect an undifferentiated 
source of capacity, or are processing limits dissociable for different types of stimuli?   
Evidence for distinct capacity limits for auditory and visual perceptual attention is 
found in dual-monitoring studies that require participants to monitor two distinct sources, 
or ‘channels’, of information to detect or discriminate targets.  When the two channels 
differ in modality (e.g. auditory and visual stimuli) the studies typically find that 
performance does not differ compared to monitoring one channel (Alais, et al., 2006; 
Duncan, et al., 1997; Larsen, et al., 2003; Treisman & Davies, 1973).  However, 
significant costs are found for attending to two channels if channels share a modality 
(e.g. two visual stimuli) (Lee et al., 1999; Pastukhov, Fischer, & Braun, 2008).   
Costs for attending to channels in different modalities has been shown in a few 
dual-monitoring studies (Arnell & Jolicoeur, 1999; Bonnel & Hafter, 1998; Jolicoeur, 
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1999a).  However, such costs have been interpreted, not as costs in perceptual 
processing, but as costs at post-perceptual stages of processing.  For example, Bonnel 
and Hafter (1998) found no cost between an auditory and visual monitoring task when 
the task involved target detection, but observed competition between modalities when 
participants were required to categorize the stimuli. They concluded that competition 
between the auditory and visual task emerges from the post-perceptual demands of 
categorization. Similarly, Arnell and Jolicoeur (1999) attributed their observed cross-
modal attentional blink, or the transient impairment in detecting the second of two targets 
(Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992), to interference in consolidating the targets for later 
report.  Jolicoeur and colleagues have argued that consolidation draws on central / post-
perceptual attention (Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua, 1998; 1999).  In sum, dual-monitoring 
studies are suggestive of independent perceptual processing capacities for auditory and 
visual stimuli.  
However, dual-monitoring studies may not be the ideal paradigm to study the 
domain-specificity of perceptual processing, as performance can depend on stimulus-
driven components of the task.  For example, tasks that require participants to detect 
intermittent targets in a stream of distractors (e.g. Duncan et al., 1997b) can allow 
participants to rely on target templates (Duncan & Humphries, 1989) to summon 
attention when a task-relevant target appears.  Setting up templates for the two sources 
of information may allow participants to employ strategies to time-share their attention 
across channels.  Additionally, measures of psychophysical discrimination thresholds 
(Alais, et al., 2006; Bonnel & Hafter, 1998) may depend on how the visual or auditory 
sensory systems are configured.  For example, if the task requires detecting whether a 
line of a certain orientation is presented, the gain of neurons that code for that orientation 
can be increased in advance of the target to improve discrimination thresholds.  Thus, 
 59 
sources of modality-specific interference in dual-monitoring tasks may be due to factors 
other than limits in the capacity for rapidly processing perceptual information.  Instead, 
costs may reflect an inability to maintaining two target templates in the same modality, or 
an inability to efficiently tune the sensory system for targets that share a modality.   
In more complex tasks, dual-task costs can occur between tasks that differ in 
modality (Allen, McGeorge, Pearson, & Milne, 2006; Kunar, Carter, Cohen, & Horowitz, 
2008; Strayer & Johnston, 2001).  For example, talking on a cell phone can disrupt visual 
navigation tasks (Strayer, et al., 2003; Strayer & Johnston, 2001).  As another example, 
tasks that require speeded responses to auditory tones (Tombu & Seiffert, 2008) or 
generation of words (Kunar et al., 2008) can interfere with participants’ ability to track 
visual targets among distractors in a multiple object tracking task (Pylyshyn & Storm, 
1988).  However, it is believed that such costs occur because of the executive demands 
of the auditory tasks.  For example, the interference from cell phone conversations is 
due to the central demands imposed by word generation rather than by auditory 
distraction (Kunar et al., 2008; Strayer & Johnston, 2001).  Since these findings can be 
explained by interference at central stages of processing they do not provide strong 
evidence against domain-specialized perceptual attention.   
However, there is reason to believe that strong links exist between auditory and 
visual perceptual attention. Studies have shown extensive interactions across modalities 
in the selection of perceptual information (Spence & Driver, 1996, 1997; Spence, 
Nicholls, & Driver, 2001).  Valid exogenous and endogenous spatial cues from one 
modality (e.g. auditory) facilitate responses to stimuli that occur in a different modality 
(e.g. vision) at the cued location. There is also strong neurophysiological evidence for 
cross-modal links between auditory and visual selective attention (Eimer & Schroger, 
1998; Ghazanfar & Schroeder, 2006; Hocherman, Benson, Goldstein, Heffner, & Hienz, 
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1976; Kayser, Petkov, Augath, & Logethetis, 2007).  Visual evoked potentials have been 
found to be enhanced for visual stimuli that are presented at a location that was cued for 
an auditory target (Eimer & Schroger, 1998).  Evidence for strong links across modalities 
provides support for domain-independent sources for the control of attention across 
tasks and modality (Chiu & Yantis, 2009; Shomstein & Yantis, 2004, 2006).  Further 
evidence for a domain-general attention system is provided by studies showing that 
attending to stimuli in one modality reduces activity evoked by stimuli in another modality 
(Laurienti, et al., 2002; Shomstein & Yantis, 2004).  In addition, activity in domain-
specific sensory regions is reduced in bimodal conditions (attention split across 
modalities) relative to attending to a single stimulus (Johnson & Zatorre, 2005, 2006).  
These results match the predictions of an attentional commodity that has to be divided 
across modalities.  
The neurophysiological evidence for a link between auditory and visual 
perceptual processing conflicts with the lack of convincing behavioral evidence for cross-
modal interference.  To explore this issue, the current studies employed tasks where the 
target-defining feature values constantly changed over time.  This prevents strategies 
where the participants can rely on stimulus-driven components of the task to time-share 
their attention.  Specifically, I use auditory and visual tracking tasks that require 
participants to individuate a target from a distractor item where the feature value(s) that 
differentiate the target from the distractor changes over the course of tracking.  Tasks 
that require the tracking of feature values over time draw on perceptual attention via the 
need to constantly adapt to changes in the target’s feature value (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 
2005).  In addition, they highlight the need for selective attention since the participant 
has to individuate the target from a similar distractor item (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988).  A 
lack of interference between such tasks would provide stronger evidence for distinct 
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perceptual processing capacities across modalities.  Alternatively, interference in this 
paradigm would place limits on the conditions in which auditory and visual processing 
tasks can be performed concurrently with no cost.  This would suggest that previous 
findings are task specific, and do not generalize to tasks that require constant tracking of 
perceptual features.   
 
Description of tracking tasks 
Three tracking tasks (two visual and one auditory) were used in the current 
studies.  In one visual tracking task (dot task) I required participants to track a target disc 
while ignoring a distractor disc (that was similar in appearance) by following the target’s 
spatiotemporal identity. Such tracking tasks have been well studied and demonstrate 
limits in visuospatial attention (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2005; Oksama & Hyönä, 2004; 
Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Sears & Pylyshyn, 2000).  In a second visual tracking task 
(gabor task) I required participants to track one of two spatially overlapping gabors by 
attending to the gabor’s color, orientation, and spatial frequency as both gabors’ feature 
properties changed over time (Blaser, Pylyshyn, & Holcombe, 2000; see Neisser & 
Becklen, 1975, for a similar task).  A novel task was developed for auditory tracking 
since previous tasks either did not require constant attention or required attention to 
semantic content.  Several auditory attention tasks rely on detecting or classifying an 
infrequent target (e.g. Duncan, et al., 1997; Arnell & Jolicoeur, 1999).  As mentioned, 
such tasks may allow strategies where attention can be time-shared across modalities 
by relying on target templates to attract attention to relevant targets.  Another common 
auditory attention task is a dichotic listening task – participants hear two spoken 
passages presented at the same time (one to each ear) and are required to attend to or 
shadow one of the passages (Allport, Antonis, & Reynolds, 1972; Cherry, 1953; Conway, 
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et al., 2001; Moray, 1959; Treisman, 1960).  Vocal passages are often highly predictive 
(Treisman, 1960) such that participants can use semantic and content cues to recover 
tracking if attention is momentarily shifted to another task.  This may afford an attention-
switching strategy in which a pool of resources is effectively shared across two tasks 
(Broadbent, 1982; Cowan, 1995).  Indeed, such a strategy has been suggested (Cowan, 
1995) to account for past findings of perfect task sharing (after practice) between 
complex tasks such as reading and taking dictation (Hirst, Spelke, Reaves, Caharack, & 
Neisser, 1980; Spelke, Hirst, & Neisser, 1976).  It is also possible that tasks with a 
semantic component may exacerbate costs due to the executive demands of language 
comprehension (Engle, 2002).  Thus, auditory tracking tasks with a language or 
semantic component have severe problems of interpretability and are not useful for 
testing whether vision and audition share a common perceptual attention capacity.   The 
novel auditory task employed in the current study requires participants to track a target 
tone as it changes in pitch and stereo position (i.e. left or right stereo space).  Studies of 
auditory perceptual segregation demonstrate that it is possible to attend to and 
distinguish one of two concurrently presented tones if the tones are presented as a 
series of alternating beeps, a phenomenon termed the ‘streaming effect’ (Bregman, 
1990; Bregman & Campbell, 1971). For the auditory system to perceive the beeps as 
two distinct sequences, the tones must differ either in pitch or stereo position (timbre can 
also be an effective cue for segregation but was not used in the current study).  
These tracking tasks were combined in a dual-task setting in which participants 
either performed one or both tasks.  Two types of task pairings were tested: multi-modal 
and uni-modal.  The multi-modal condition paired the gabor tracking task with the tone 
tracking task. The uni-modal condition paired the gabor tracking task with the dot 
tracking task.  In addition, there were two levels of difficulty for each task, with hard 
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difficulty trials having a faster rate of feature change over time than easy difficulty trials. 
The tone and dot tracking tasks were not paired since both tasks required attention to 
spatial information.  Therefore, interference between these tasks could have been larger 
than the other task combinations due to an additional source of interference at a 
representational level.   
 
Predictions 
A critical question is whether performance for tracking an auditory and visual 
target will resemble performance for tracking one target (predicted by proposals 
suggesting that there are independent perceptual capacities across modalities; Alais, et 
al., 2006; Duncan et al., 1997; Larsen et al., 2003) or performance for tracking two 
targets from the same modality (predicted by theories proposing a domain-general 
source of processing or attentional control; Chiu & Yantis, 2009; Cowan, 1995; Daneman 
& Carpenter, 1980; Johnson & Zatorre, 2005; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Kane et al., 2004; 
Shomstein & Yantis, 2004; Treisman, 1969; Wickens, 1984).  The former hypothesis 
predicts no difference in performance between single-task and dual-task performance in 
the multi-modal condition.  The latter hypothesis predicts that not only will there be 
strong dual-task costs in the multi-modal condition, but that they will be equivalent to 
those observed in the uni-modal condition.  Intermediate results are also possible—dual-
task costs in the multi-modal condition that are significantly less than that observed in 
the uni-modal condition—and are consistent with theories that allow both domain-
general and domain-specific contributions to task performance (Kane et al., 2004; 
Treisman & Davies, 1973).    
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Figure 7:  Timeline for a dual-task trial involving the gabor and dot tracking tasks.  The probed task (gabor or dot task) was 
selected at random.  
 
General Methods 
 
Trial outline 
The task procedure for these studies involved concurrent presentation of two 
tracking tasks.  In Experiment 1, participants performed the gabor tracking task, the tone 
tracking task, or both tasks concurrently.  In Experiment 2, participants performed the 
gabor tracking task, the dot tracking task, or both tasks concurrently  
A trial began with target encoding (3000ms).  Participants were presented with a 
target for each of the two tasks and were instructed to encode both targets.  Targets 
remained onscreen for the entire duration of the target encoding period.  Since both 
targets were always presented, single- and dual-task trials were equivalent until the task 
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cue was presented. The task cue (2000ms) instructed participants which target(s) they 
should follow during the tracking interval.  Following 2000ms of cue presentation, the cue 
was removed and both targets remained for 2000ms.  This 2000ms post-cue phase 
gave participants more than adequate time to adjust their task set to attend to the task-
relevant target(s).  Following the post-cue period, a single distractor for each task was 
presented.  The distractor differed from the target (see individual task methods) in the 
task-relevant feature(s), and was easily differentiated from the target even though both 
target and distractor were presented concurrently.  The distractor onset phase (1000ms) 
gave participants time to adjust to selectively attending to the target(s) before the onset 
of tracking. A timeline for a trial is shown in Figure 7 within the context of a dual-task trial 
involving both the gabor and dot tasks   
During the tracking interval (8000ms) the target and distractor for each task 
continually changed in the task-relevant features (see individual task methods).  To 
differentiate target from distractor, participants needed to constantly attend to the target, 
since the feature values that allow the target to be distinguished from the distractor 
changed over time.  Note that during the tracking phase the stimuli for both tasks were 
presented, even during single-task conditions.  Thus, differences in performance 
between single- and dual-task conditions cannot be explained by differences in sensory 
stimulation during tracking.   
To test whether participants successfully tracked the target in cued task(s), at the 
end of the tracking interval only one of the two stimuli remained on and participants were 
to indicate whether the remaining stimulus was a target or a distractor (each possibility 
equally likely).  In dual-task trials, only one of the two tasks was probed, with the task 
selected at random (each task equally likely).  For example, in a dual-task trial involving 
an auditory and visual tracking task, the probe may consist of either the presentation of 
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the visual target, visual distractor, auditory target, or auditory distractor. In single-task 
trials, the probe was always for the cued task. The probe did not change in feature 
values during its presentation. Participants were instructed to indicate whether the probe 
item was a target or distractor by selecting one of two buttons with their right hand. 
Responses were unspeeded, and accuracy was stressed. Trials were self-paced and 
accuracy feedback was provided after each response.   
 
Task Conditions 
 Each task had two levels of difficulty—hard and easy—with difficulty varying by 
the speed at which features changed during tracking.  The difficulty of hard and easy 
task conditions was titrated by block and task based on performance in the single-task 
conditions in the prior block.  Specifically, the rate of change in featural values for the 
easy difficulty level of a specific task decreased whenever participants made at least one 
an error on the previous block.  The rate of change in featural values for the difficult 
condition decreased whenever participants made three or more errors (out of eight 
trials).  However, if participants got no more than one incorrect response in difficult 
single-task trials in the previous block, the rate of change increased.  The advantage of 
this difficulty titration is that it minimizes differences in task load across tasks, even 
accounting for individual differences in relative task competence.  For each participant, 
performance in the easy single-task conditions should approach 100% and performance 
in the difficult single-task conditions should hover near 75%.  Over the first few blocks, 
large fluctuations in task difficulty may be observed.  However, by the end of the 
experiment changes in task difficulty over time should be minimal.    
 There were four single-task conditions formed by the cross of probed feature 
(auditory or visual) and task difficulty (easy or hard).  There were eight dual-task 
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conditions formed by the cross of probed feature (auditory or visual), task difficulty (easy 
or hard), and other task load (easy or hard).  Note that to minimize confusion I use the 
term difficulty to refer to the difficulty level of the probed task and the term load to 
reference the difficulty level of the secondary (non-probed) task.  This allows for an 
assessment of task performance across three levels of secondary task load: single-task, 
low load (easy), and high load (hard). Task conditions were randomly intermixed within 
blocks.  
 Each participant completed two single-task blocks followed by five intermixed 
blocks containing both single- and dual-task trials.  The single-task blocks consisted of 
eight trials of each single-task condition for a total of 32 trials.  These blocks served to 
provide an initial titration of task difficulty for each task and difficulty level.  The 
intermixed blocks consisted of eight trials of each single-task condition and four trials of 
each of the eight dual-task conditions for a total of 64 trials.  Thus, single- and dual- task 
trials happened equally often in intermixed blocks.  Participants completed the seven 
blocks across two days with no more than two days separation.  Participants completed 
four blocks the first day and three blocks the second day.   
 Bonus pay was provided, to motivate participants.  Bonus pay ranged from 0-10$ 
per day and was based on both single- and dual-task performance.  Specifically, bonus 
pay for single-task trials (maximum of 5$ per day) was based on the final setting of the 
difficulty titration, averaged across all single-task trials.  Difficulty was adjusted in 
discrete steps for each study, allowing the final difficulty level to be represented as a 
percentage ranging from the minimum final difficulty value (assuming that difficulty 
decreased for both easy and hard conditions after each block) to the maximum final 
difficulty value (assuming that difficulty increased for the hard condition after each block) 
(see task-specific methods).  To determine single-task bonus pay, this percentage was 
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multiplied by five. To calculate bonus pay for dual-task trials, the percentage change in 
dual-task relative to single-task accuracy (averaged across all dual-task trials) was 
multiplied by ten, and this result was subtracted from 5$.  Values above 5$ (less than 
0% cost) or below 0% (greater than 50% cost) were not allowed. Participants were not 
told the details of the bonus pay calculations.  They were simply told that bonus pay was 
linked to overall task performance and that they should try to perform well on all trials.    
 
Task-specific methods 
  In the following section, the methods are described in detail for each of the three 
tracking tasks.   
 
Gabor task 
 The gabor task consisted of the sequential presentation of two gabor patches in 
the center of the screen, one of which is designated as a target. When two gabors are 
presented alternately at a fast rate, participants can perceive and segregate both gabors 
even though they occupy the same spatial position (Blaser et al., 2000).  Participants 
attended to the color, orientation, and spatial frequency values of the target to 
differentiate the two gabors.  Attending to only one feature would be insufficient for the 
task, since, at any point the two gabors could share a value in one feature.  However, 
the gabors were never the same value in two or more features at any given time.  A 
previous study has shown that participants can selectively track one of two gabors at this 
rate of presentation by attending to one or more features (Blaser et al., 2000).   
The gabors were presented in a 1.5º x 1.5º area in the center of the screen.  
Target and distractor gabors were presented on alternating screen refreshes at a rate of 
10ms per refresh. Color values for the two gabors were drawn from a circle in the CIE 
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L*a*b* color space (centered at L=54, a=18, b=-8, with a radius of 59).  The initial value 
of the two gabors differed by at least 60º of L*a*b* color space.  Initial orientation values 
of the two gabors varied between 1º and 360º, and differed by at least 60º.  The spatial 
frequency of the two gabors was randomly assigned within the range of .35º-.85º 
degrees of visual angle / period (angle per period, or APP).  The initial spatial frequency 
value of the gabors differed by at least .1º APP.  The task-cue to signal participants to 
attend to the gabor task was a red frame (.08º thick) surrounding the target gabor.   
During the tracking phase, the color, orientation, and spatial frequency values of 
the two gabors changed at a rate specified by the difficulty of the gabor task (easy or 
hard) and by participants past performance.  For the easy task condition, color and 
orientation initially changed at a rate of 1.25º (in color or orientation space) per 20ms, 
while spatial frequency changed at a rate of .01 APP.  For the hard task condition, color 
and orientation initially changed at a rate of 1.75º, while spatial frequency changed at a 
rate of .014 APP.  If the prior block performance was too low (1 or more incorrect 
response for the easy condition, 3 or more incorrect responses for the difficult condition), 
the rate of feature change was decreased for all features.  Specifically, color and 
orientation change rate decreased by .25º and spatial frequency change rate decreased 
by .002 APP.  If the prior block performance was too high (1 or less incorrect response 
for the difficult condition) the rate of change for color and orientation increased by .25º 
and spatial frequency change rate increased by .002 APP.  The change rate could not 
be less than .25º for color and orientation, or less than .002 APP for spatial frequency.  
The direction of change was set randomly per feature per gabor, and had a 10% chance 
of changing direction every refresh (set independently for each feature).  Note that, for a 
few participants the initial difficulty settings were different (1.0º for the easy condition; 
1.25º for the hard condition).   
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Tone task 
When a series of tones of two distinct pitch frequencies is presented at a high 
rate, participants perceive the tones as two distinct ‘auditory streams’ segregated by 
pitch (Bregman, 1971).  This auditory phenomenon was leveraged to create a tone 
tracking task similar to the gabor tracking task.  Initially, the target stream was presented 
in isolation as a series of tones at a constant pitch and stereo channel (left, center, or 
right) with a presentation rate determined by the task condition (easy or hard difficulty) 
and past task performance.    However, beginning in the distractor onset phase, target 
and distractors were presented as alternating tones.  This continued throughout the 
tracking interval as participants attended to the target’s pitch and position in stereo 
space.   
At the start of each trial, the target and distractor were assigned an initial pitch 
value between 220 and 1540 Hz in steps of 120 Hz, with the restriction that the two 
starting pitch values differed by at least 360 Hz.  Additionally, the distractor and target 
were assigned distinct positions in stereo space (left, right, or center). The left and right 
position of stereo space corresponded to the sound being played to the left or right ear, 
respectively, with no sound played to the other ear.  The center position of stereo space 
involved sound presentation to both ears at 50% intensity.   
Whenever an auditory stream changed in pitch or position in stereo space it did 
so over a period of six tones, termed cycles. Cycle rate and the number of cycles per 
trial varied according to the task difficulty condition (easy or hard) and performance in 
previous blocks.  During the tracking phase, at the start of each cycle, target and 
distractor streams were assigned a new pitch and stereo position.  Pitch was selected 
with the restriction that streams were assigned a different pitch value from the last cycle, 
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and that target and distractor pitch values had to differ by at least 360 Hz.  A stereo 
position (either left, center, or right) was assigned to the target and distractor each cycle, 
with replacement.  However, to minimize confusion arising from the breakdown in 
perceptual segregation cues (Bergman, 1971), the target and distractor tones were not 
allowed to share a stereo position when the tones crossed pitch (e.g. the target was 
initially a higher pitch than the distractor, but then become lower).  Instead, the target 
and distractor tones were assigned distinct positions in stereo space for the cycle prior to 
the pitch crossing, and stereo position did not change for the following cycle. Thus, when 
the tone streams crossed pitch, participants could use position in stereo space to 
differentiate the target from distractor. In order to prevent participants from relying on 
categorical labels, it was ensured that the tones crossed pitch at least once per trial.  
The average number of crosses averaged across each participant and each trial was 
3.44.   
Pitch and stereo position values changed across the two tones in a gradual 
fashion throughout a cycle.  For example, if an auditory stream of 220 Hz in the left 
channel were to change into a 580 Hz stream in the right channel, for each tone of that 
cycle, the frequency and stereo position would change in 1/6 steps.  The pitch values for 
those six tones would be 280, 340, 400, 460, 520, and 580 Hz.  The intensity in the left 
stereo channel would change from 83%, 67%, 50%, 33%, 17%, 0%, and the intensity in 
the right stereo channel would change in the opposite direction.  
The number of cycles per tracking phase (also the number of changes per trial) 
varied according to the task difficulty condition (easy or hard) and performance in 
previous blocks.  Initially, easy trials had 9 cycles per tracking phase and hard trials had 
12 cycles per tracking phase.  Both cycle rate and the alternation rate (time between the 
onset of one tone to the onset of the next tone) were determined by the number of 
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cycles.  For example, if there were 10 cycles, the total duration of each cycle would be 
800ms (8000ms / 10) with an alternation rate of 67ms (800ms / 12).  Regardless of the 
alternation rate, there was always a 5ms gap between the onset of one tone and the 
onset of the next tone.  The number of cycles per trial changed, independently for each 
difficulty condition, as a function of single-task performance in the prior block.  Whenever 
performance was too low for the easy and hard conditions, the number of cycles 
decreased by one.  In contrast, if performance was too high for the hard condition, the 
number of cycles increased by one. Note that, for some participants the initial difficulty 
settings differed (5 cycles for the easy condition; 9 cycles for the hard condition). To cue 
that the tone-task was task-relevant, the intermittent target tone stream was replaced by 
a long beep at the same pitch, intensity, and position in stereo space as the target.  This 
beep lasted the duration of the task cue phase (2000ms). 
 
Dot task 
The Dot task is a variant of the multiple object tracking task (Pylyshyn & Storm, 
1988) in which participants follow one target presented with a like distractor by following 
the target’s spatiotemporal identity.  The dots were solid black circles that subtended 
.19º of visual angle.  Dots were presented within the 1.5º x 1.5º spatial extent of the 
gabor patches and appeared superimposed over the gabors. The target dot appeared 
red during the task-cue phase to indicate that the dot task was task-relevant. Prior to the 
tracking interval, the target and distractor differed in spatial position.  During the tracking 
phase, target and distractor position changed over time.  Participants were required to 
constantly attend to and follow the target’s position to differentiate it from the distractor 
throughout the tracking interval.   
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Target and distractor dots were assigned unique random positions (no less than 
.31º apart) within a 1.2º x 1.2º area in the center of the gabor patches.  At the start of the 
tracking interval target and distractor dots were independently assigned a motion 
direction vector selected from 45º, 135º, 225º, and 315º.  The rate of change in position 
was determined by the difficulty condition (easy or hard) and prior single-task 
performance.  For easy condition trials, the dots initially moved at a rate of .035º per 
screen refresh (10ms).  For the hard condition, the dots initially moved at a rate of .047º 
per screen refresh.  Speed of tracking was adjusted based on single-task performance in 
the prior block.  If performance was lower than desired, tracking speed decreased by 
.0065º per screen refresh.  In contrast, if performance was too high, tracking speed 
increased by .0065º. Note that for a few participants the initial difficulty settings were 
different (.029º for the easy condition; .035º for the hard condition). 
On each refresh, each dot had a 10% chance of being assigned a new vector 
selected from 45º, 135º, 225º, and 315º.  In addition, whenever a dot neared the edge 
(within .3º) its vector was flipped.  If the target and distractor dots neared each other 
(within .25º) the dots were assigned vectors to move in opposite directions.   
 
Analysis 
Individual experiment analysis 
For each experiment the data was analyzed to determine: 
1) Whether performance in the single-tasks were comparable across tasks 
2) Whether the tasks mutually interfered 
3) Whether these dual-task costs were load-dependent 
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Each analysis described below was conducted on two data sets.  To provide the 
least noisy estimate of the condition means (lower variability) analyses were conducted 
on blocks three through seven.  However, this data set may not have allowed enough 
blocks to fine-tune the difficulty levels of single-task conditions.  Therefore, a second set 
of analyses included only the blocks from the second session (5-7). It is important to 
note that most results were qualitatively the same across both data sets.  To minimize 
duplication of the reported findings, analyses and figures are reported only using the 
data set that included blocks three through seven.  However, the results for both data 
sets are reported in the rare instances in which the data sets produced qualitatively 
different results.  
In order to compare the magnitude of dual-task costs across experiments it is 
important that the demands imposed by the various tasks were nearly equivalent.  In an 
attempt to equate demands across tasks, the current study titrated performance for each 
task for easy and hard conditions.  To test whether the titration method was successful 
in equating task performance, accuracy in single-task conditions was entered into a 2 
(task) x 2 (difficulty) ANOVA.  Although no difference in performance across tasks was 
expected, there should be a main effect of difficulty because the easy and hard 
conditions were titrated at 100% and 75% performance rates, respectively.  
To determine whether the tasks mutually interfered a 3 x 2 ANOVA, with task 
accuracy as the dependent measure and factors of load (single-task, low, high) and 
difficulty (easy, hard), tested for a main effect of load.  However, any dual-task costs 
revealed by an overall load effect could be due to the difficulty of performing two tasks 
concurrently, rather than competition for a common perceptual attention capacity.  In a 
subsequent analysis, I asked whether dual-task costs increase with overall task load. 
Specifically, a 2 x 2 ANOVA, with factors of load (low, high) and difficulty (easy, hard), 
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tested whether performance was worse in high load, relative to low load dual-task 
conditions.  
The dual-task analyses were carried out on data collapsed across probe type.  
Due to the length of trials and the high number of conditions there are insufficient trials 
for reliable estimates of performance for each probe.   
 
Across experiment analysis 
In addition to the experiment specific analyses, the costs across studies were 
compared to determine: 
1) Whether there was a difference in concurrence costs between uni- and multi-
modal experiments.  
2) Whether there was a difference in load-dependent dual-task costs between 
uni- and multi-modal experiments.   
 
Concurrence costs (interference between two tasks that occur independent of 
task load) were measured as the difference in performance between single-task 
conditions and low load dual-task conditions (averaged across probed task).  Note that 
load here refers to the difficulty of the secondary task.  These costs were entered into a 
between-subjects 2 x 2 ANOVA with the factors of Experiment (uni-modal, multi-modal) 
and difficulty (easy, hard).  To measure load-dependent costs, performance in dual-task 
high load conditions was subtracted from dual-task low load conditions.  These costs 
were entered into a between-subjects 2 x 2 ANOVA with factors of Experiment and 
difficulty.  The critical question in both analyses was whether the ANOVA test revealed a 
significant main effect of experiment (main effects of difficulty were not expected).   
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Experiment 1 
 
Methods 
The goal of this study was to determine the amount of dual-task interference 
observed in a multi-modal pairing of attentional tracking tasks. The gabor and tone 
tracking tasks were presented such that the task phases overlapped. Fourteen 
participants (seven male) were required to perform the gabor tracking task, the tone 
tracking task, or both tasks simultaneously.  Single- and dual-task trials differed only 
during the task-cue phase.  On dual-task trials both the gabor and tone task-cue were 
presented (see individual task methods).   
 
Results and Discussion 
Single-task performance 
Percent correct for the single-task conditions by task and difficulty is shown in 
Figure 8A.  Additionally, Figure 9A shows the change in difficulty across blocks, 
represented as the number of changes (tone task) and the rate of change in orientation, 
color, and spatial frequency values (in degrees or APP) per gabor alternation (gabor 
task).  To compare single-task performance across tasks, percent correct for single-task 
trials was entered into a 2 x 2 ANOVA with factors of difficulty (easy, hard) and task 
(gabor, tone).  This revealed a main effect of difficulty (F(1, 13) = 50.83, p < .001), no 
main effect of task (F(1, 13) = .02, p = .90), and an interaction between task and difficulty 
(F(1, 13) = 11.22, p < .01).   
The results show that the difficulty manipulation was successful—hard trials had 
significantly lower performance, suggesting that performance for those tasks is more 
demanding and may require more capacity.  In regards to whether the tasks were 
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equated for difficulty, the lack of a task effect provides some support.  However, the 
interaction between task and difficulty suggests that the difficulty titration did not work 
equivalently for each task.  Indeed, the performance rates for the tone task were lower 
than expected for the easy difficulty condition and higher than expected for the hard 
difficulty condition.  Why might this have happened?  Note that increasing the number of 
cycles had the effect of decreasing the alternation rate between tones.  Previous studies 
have shown that the ability to perceptually segregate tones improves as the alternation 
rate increases (Bregman & Campbell, 1971).  While this effect occurs largely outside of 
the range of alternations in the current study (it is typically found at slower alternation 
rates) it is possible that two factors altered performance in an opposing manner as the 
number of cycles increased or decreased.  In the easy condition, as difficulty levels 
decreased, the reduced number of changes may have decreased task difficulty while the 
decreased alternation rate may have added to the task’s difficulty. A similar explanation 
may account for the higher than expected performance in the hard difficulty condition.  
Thus, it is possible that the auditory load manipulation was insufficiently strong and that 
the current study may actually underestimate load-dependent dual-task costs.  This 
issue will be discussed further when dual-task costs for Experiment 1 and 2 are 
compared.   
 
Comparison of dual-task versus single-task conditions 
Figure 10A shows percent correct as a function of probed task difficulty and 
secondary task load.  Note that this analysis collapses across the task that was probed 
(tone or gabor task).  Percent correct was entered into a 2 x 3 ANOVA with factors of 
difficulty (easy, hard) and load (single-task, low, high).  The results showed a main effect 
of difficulty, F(1, 13) = 90.05, p < .001, with worse performance for hard trials.  
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Additionally, there was a main effect of secondary load (F(1, 13) = 20.97, p < .001), but 
no interaction between difficulty and load (F(1, 13) = .10, p = .90).  
These results show, in contrast to several previous studies (Alais, et al., 2006; 
Duncan, et al., 1997; Larsen, et al., 2003; Soto-Faraco & Spence, 2002; Treisman & 
Davies, 1973), that visual and auditory perceptual attention tasks can substantively 
interfere with each other.  Furthermore, this interference was load-dependent.  A 
subsequent ANOVA found that performance was worse in the high load relative to low 
load dual-task condition.  Specifically, a 2 x 2 ANOVA with factors of difficulty (easy, 
hard) and load (low, high) found a main effect of difficulty (F(1, 13) = 68.39, p < .001), a 
main effect of secondary task load (F(1, 13) = 8.11, p < .05), but no interaction (F(1, 13) 
= .08, p = .76).  This is strong evidence for competition between auditory and visual 
tracking tasks.  Note that single- and dual-task conditions were perceptually equivalent 
except for the 2000ms task cue interval. Therefore, differences in low-level sensory 
stimulation cannot explain the results.  Also, the fact that the observed interference 
increased with increased secondary task load refutes the possibility that costs may be 
due simply to coordinating two tasks.  
Note that an interaction between the factors of difficulty and load was not 
observed.  This interaction might be predicted from previous studies suggesting that 
tasks that tap into common processes will interfere in an over-additive fashion (Johnston 
et al., 1995; Logan, 1978, 1979; Sternberg, 1966).  However, it is possible that over-
additive costs may not be observed here since the size of an expected effect may scale 
with the mean value of accuracy performance (meaning that load-dependent costs may 
be numerically smaller for the difficult conditions as accuracy performance was lower), 
thus masking an over-additive interaction between the two factors.  Note that this 
interaction was also not observed in the uni-modal condition.  Therefore, the absence of 
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Figure 8:  Single-task accuracy for the multi-modal (A) and uni-modal (B) experiments as a function of task difficulty and 
task.  Error bars represent within-subject error of the main effect of task.   
 
a load x difficulty interaction does not provide evidence for a domain-specific source of 
perceptual attention.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9:  A: Difficulty levels across block in the multi-modal study for the tone tracking task (left) and gabor tracking task (right).  
B: Difficulty levels across block in the uni-modal study for the dot tracking task (left) and the gabor tracking task (right).  For the 
gabor task, rate of orientation and color changes were measured in degrees / alternation while spatial frequency was measured 
in APP / alternation.  
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The current data show cross-modal interference in tasks that require tracking of 
perceptual information over time, in contrast to accounts that suggest that auditory and 
visual attention have independent perceptual attention capacity (Alais, et al., 2006; 
Duncan, et al., 1997).  Dual-task costs in this multi-modal experiment can be compared 
to costs observed in Experiment 2, which pairs two visual tasks, to determine the relative 
combination of domain-general and domain-independent sources of perceptual tracking.   
 
 
Figure 10:  Task accuracy for the single-task conditions for the multi-modal (A) and uni-modal (B) experiments as a 
function of task difficulty and secondary task load.  Error bars represent within-subject error of the main effect of load.   
 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Methods 
A different set of fourteen participants (five male) were required to perform the 
gabor tracking task, the dot tracking task, or both tasks simultaneously.  The trial phases 
of the gabor and dot tracking tasks overlapped (Figure 7), with single- and dual-task 
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conditions differing only during the task-cue phase.  The dot stimuli were always 
presented over the 1.5º x 1.5º gabor patch. On dual-task trials both the gabor and dot 
task-cue were presented (see individual task methods).   
 
Results & Discussion 
Single-task performance 
Percent correct for the single-task conditions by task and difficulty, is shown in 
Figure 8B.  Figure 9B shows the change in difficulty across blocks, represented as the 
rate of movement (in visual angle) per screen refresh (dot task) or the rate of change in 
orientation, color, and spatial frequency values (in degrees or APP) per gabor alternation 
(gabor task).  To compare single-task performance across tasks, percent correct for 
single-task trials was entered into a 2 x 2 ANOVA with factors of difficulty (easy, hard) 
and task (gabor, tone).  This revealed a main effect of difficulty (F(1, 13) = 177.27, p < 
.001), no main effect of task (F(1, 13) = .52, p = .48), and no interaction between task 
and difficulty (F(1, 13) = .38, p = .55).  Thus, I can conclude that the two tasks were 
equivalently difficult for participants across both easy and hard difficulty conditions.   
 
Comparison of dual-task versus single-task conditions 
Figure 10B shows percent correct as a function of probed task difficulty and 
secondary task load. Percent correct was entered into a 2 x 3 ANOVA with factors of 
difficulty (easy, hard) and load (single-task, low, high).  The results showed a main effect 
of difficulty, F(1, 13) = 118.36, p < .001, with worse performance for hard trials.  
Additionally, there was a main effect of secondary load (F(1, 13) = 26.73, p < .001), but 
no interaction between difficulty and load (F(1, 13) = .72, p = .50). A second analysis 
excluded single-task conditions to determine whether interference was load-dependent.  
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A 2 x 2 ANOVA with factors of difficulty (easy, hard) and load (low, high) found a main 
effect of difficulty (F(1, 13) = 74.98, p < .001), a main effect of secondary task load (F(1, 
13) = 5.20, p < .05), but no interaction between the factors of difficulty and load (F(1, 13) 
= .79, p = .39).  However, if the above ANOVA is restricted to only include data from the 
second session, no main effect of difficulty is observed (p = .48).  This is likely due to a 
floor effect in performance during the hard difficulty trials as performance in the low load 
condition was less than 60% across the last three blocks.  Predictably, this also shows 
an interaction between difficulty and secondary task load (p=.02) with a larger load effect 
in the easy difficulty condition.  Thus, it is possible that the effect of secondary task load 
is underestimated in the hard difficulty condition.  
The fact that the current study shows strong, load-dependent costs between two 
visual perceptual attention tasks is not surprising, and is consistent with previous studies 
(Lee, et al., 1999; Pastukhov, et al., 2008).  However, this study goes beyond previous 
experiments by also manipulating attentional load.  The results clearly show that dual-
task costs increased with increased load.  Thus, a novel contribution of this study is to 
rule out the possibility that previous evidence of interference between visual tasks is not 
simply due to executive demands required to coordinate two tasks or to load-
independent representational interference.    
 
Comparison of costs in Experiments 1 and 2 
Dual-task costs were compared across Experiments 1 and 2 to test whether 
there were differences between the multi-modal and uni-modal task pairings.  Task 
accuracy was entered into a between-subjects 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA with factors of 
Experiment (multi-modal, uni-modal), difficulty (easy, hard) and load (single-task, low, 
high).  There was a main effect of difficulty (F(1, 26) = 208.31, p < .001), a main effect of 
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load (F(2, 52) = 47.03, p < .001), but no main effect of Experiment (F(1, 26) = .63, p < 
.43), and no significant interactions (all p’s > .1).  Thus, there is no evidence of a 
domain-specific contribution to dual-task costs between two tracking tasks when overall 
costs are examined.  However, overall dual-task costs may emerge from both 
concurrence costs (measured by the difference between single-task and low-load dual-
task performance) and load-dependent costs (measured by the difference between low 
load dual-task and high load dual-task performance). Concurrence costs may be 
influenced by a combination of competition for a shared, limited capacity, task 
coordination costs, and load-independent interference between tasks. Load-dependent 
costs measure the decrease in performance as load increases, and are thus relatively 
pure measures of competition between tasks because task coordination costs will be 
present in both the low load and high load dual-task conditions.  These two forms of 
costs were independently compared across experiments.   
To compare concurrence costs, participants’ percent correct for the low load 
dual-task conditions were subtracted from performance in singe-task conditions 
(separately for each level of task difficulty).  These costs were entered into a between-
subjects 2 x 2 ANOVA with factors of Experiment (multi-modal, uni-modal) and difficulty 
(easy, hard).  The ANOVA found a main effect of Experiment, F(1, 26) = 4.21, p = .05, 
with greater concurrence costs in the uni-modal condition,  The results showed no main 
effect of difficulty (F(1, 26) = 1.06, p = .31), and no interaction between Experiment and 
difficulty (F(1, 26) = .64, p = .43).   
To compare load-dependent costs, participants’ percent correct for the high load 
dual-task conditions were subtracted from performance in low load dual-task conditions 
and entered into a between-subjects 2 x 2 ANOVA with factors of Experiment (multi-
modal, uni-modal) and difficulty (easy, hard).  The ANOVA found no main effect of 
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Experiment (F(1, 26) = .05, p = .82), no main effect of difficulty (F(1, 26) = .31, p = .56), 
and no interaction between Experiment and difficulty, (F(1, 26) = .80, p = .38).  Results 
on both concurrence and load-dependent analyses were similar if the data set only 
included data from the second session.  The only exception was that the ANOVA for 
concurrence costs found an interaction between the factors of difficulty and experiment 
(F(1, 26) = 4.52, p = .05) showing that domain-specific concurrence costs were greater 
in hard difficulty conditions.    
Thus, while the overall ANOVA found no difference in costs between the uni-
modal and multi-modal experiments, differences were revealed when tasks costs were 
separated into concurrence and load-dependent costs.  Specifically, while load-
dependent costs were found to be similar across both experiments, the concurrence 
costs were significantly higher in the uni-modal than multi-modal experiments.    
 
Discussion of Chapter III 
To explore the generality or specificity of perceptual attention, here I required 
participants to concurrently perform tracking tasks that shared or differed in modality.  
Significant dual-task costs were found between visual and auditory tracking tasks.  
Furthermore, these costs increased with dual-task load.  Additionally, a comparison of 
concurrence and load-dependent costs between multi- and uni-modal task combinations 
found equivalent load-dependent costs.  However, there was also evidence for a 
domain-specific contribution to perceptual tracking performance.  While the overall 
concurrence costs certainly include a domain-general contribution (as costs were 
significant in both the uni-modal and multi-modal conditions), the fact that concurrence 
costs were greater in the uni-modal condition relative to the multi-modal condition 
suggests an additional uni-modal specific concurrence cost.  These results suggest that 
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perceptual attention performance is constrained by both domain-general and domain-
specific sources. Furthermore, the results raise the interesting possibility that increasing 
attentional load affects performance in a domain-general way.  This finding needs to be 
interpreted with some caution, however, as both uni-modal and multi-modal costs may 
have been underestimated in these studies, but for different reasons.  One concern is 
that load-dependent costs may have been underestimated in the uni-modal condition 
due to a floor effect or a diminishing effect of withdrawing attention at low task 
performance rates.  However, this would have had to significantly and disproportionably 
impact the uni-modal hard difficulty condition in order to explain the lack of a main effect 
of Experiment. It is also worth noting that while the lack of an effect of Experiment for 
load-dependent costs was a null result, costs were if anything slightly larger in the multi-
modal condition.  Indeed, Bayesian analysis (Rouder et al., 2009) on the comparison of 
costs across experiments (averaged across task difficulty; t = -.23, p = .82) suggests that 
the null hypothesis is 3.62 times more likely than the alternate hypothesis.  While further 
research is necessary to refute the possibility that a floor effect caused the lack of an 
effect of Experiment for load-dependent costs, the current results argue that increased 
tracking speed draws (at least significantly) on an amodal source of capacity.    
Load-dependent costs may also have been underestimated in the multi-modal 
condition since the single-task performance data suggested a weaker effect of 
secondary auditory task load (low task difficulty performance was worse than expected, 
and high task difficulty performance was better than expected).  Note though that such 
effects go in the opposite direction necessary to account for the uni-modal specific 
concurrence cost and the domain-general load-dependent effect.  Thus, this effect 
cannot explain the current data, but suggests caution in designing an auditory tracking 
task where alternation rate is manipulated.   
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Why might domain-specific costs not increase under more difficult tracking 
conditions?  One possibility is that domain-specific costs arose from an inconsistency in 
the spatial window of visuospatial attention required by the dot and gabor tasks.  
Tracking a target dot requires focal attention (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2005) whereas 
attending to the gabor might require a broader attentional window to perceive the 
orientation and spatial frequency.  Previous experiments on the extent of spatial 
attention have suggesting that while the spatial extent of attention is adjustable, it cannot 
be shrunk to less than 2º x 2º of visual angle (Eriksen and St. James, 1986).   The 
spatial extent of the gabor patches in the current study (1.5º x 1.5º of visual angle) were 
smaller than this minimum window of attention.  Therefore, there is reason to suspect 
that similar attentional windows were adopted in single-task and dual-task conditions, 
although the possibility that costs arose from differences in the attentional focus across 
conditions (which would occur in dual-task conditions but not increase with secondary 
task load) cannot be completely ruled out.   
Another possibility is that the domain specific costs arise from the need to 
maintain and differentiate modality-specific object representations.  The number of 
representations increased between single- and dual-task conditions, but not with 
increased task load.  This makes the speculative prediction that domain-specific costs 
will increase if tracking set size, rather than tracking difficulty, is manipulated.  The 
source of these domain specific costs may be, in the case of interference between visual 
tasks, in posterior regions of parietal cortex (Shim, Alvarez, Vickery, & Jiang, 2009).  
While posterior parietal cortex has been shown to be critically involved in multiple object 
tracking (Culham, Cavanagh, & Kanwisher, 2001; Jovicich et al., 2001), it has recently 
been shown that activity in this region is not modulated by tracking speed, even though 
tracking speed substantially affected performance (Shim et al., 2009).  In contrast, 
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manipulations of tracking set size modulate activity in posterior parietal cortex (Culham 
et al., Jovicich et al., 2001; Shim et al., 2009).  While strong evidence points to the 
critical role of the posterior parietal cortex in visuospatial tracking, the degree to which it 
contributes in a domain-specific fashion is not yet known.   
Alternatively, it may be possible to explain the uni-modal specific concurrence 
cost as due to interference or representational overlap in early visual areas.  Increasing 
the tracking rate of stimuli may not exacerbate the overlap in representational demands 
in early visual areas.  Instead, increasing tracking speed may increase the speed at 
which information in early visual / auditory needs to be communicated to brain regions 
for further processing.  If the demands imposed by increased tracking speed draw 
selectively on processing stages that occur after representation in domain-specific 
sensory cortex this could explain the lack of domain-specific effects found for increasing 
task load.   
The current study was motivated by the inability of previous dual-monitoring 
studies to rule out participant strategies that allow time-sharing of attention as 
explanations for the lack of multi-modal costs.  The findings of significant and load-
dependent costs in the current study suggest that the lack of costs with these tasks 
should be reconsidered.  However, the findings do not necessarily imply that previous 
findings were due to these concerns.  Indeed, there are other factors that need to be 
considered.  Dual-monitoring studies involve measuring psychophysical thresholds for 
either detecting or classifying target stimuli or detecting targets among a stream of 
distractors (e.g. Alais, et al., 2006; Duncan, et al., 1997).  It may be that such tasks draw 
on different types of perceptual demands.  Both tracking tasks and measurements of 
psychophysical thresholds are considered to draw on perceptual attention (Alvarez & 
Cavanagh, 2005; Lee, et al., 1999; Pastukhov, et al., 2008; Scholl, 2004).  However, 
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perceptual attention may not represent a monolithic capacity, and there may be distinct 
mechanisms of attention at different stages of perceptual processing (Kastner & Pinsk, 
2004).  Indeed, the tracking tasks require the integration of sensory information, often 
across multiple sources sensory information (e.g. color and orientation; stereo position 
and pitch), into a perceptual object that must be individuated from a distractor object.  In 
contrast some studies showing distinct perceptual processing for auditory and visual 
tasks have measured discrimination thresholds for basic visual or auditory attributes 
(such as brightness or pitch).  These same sensory attributes when presented in the 
context of a visual search task have been shown to ‘pop out’, meaning that the number 
of distractors does not matter (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 1994).  These 
differences across tasks suggest the possibility that psychophysical measures of 
discrimination are due to modulation of activity in neurons that preferentially code a 
specific sensory attribute (possibly as early as the lateral geniculate nucleus for visual 
stimuli; O’Conner, Fukui, Pinsk, & Kastner, 2002), whereas tracking is mediated by 
competition among objects for representation in higher areas of visual / auditory cortex 
(Kastner & Pinsk, 2004; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000, 2001).  
It is also possible that dual-monitoring studies draw only on perceptual attention 
while tracking tasks also draw on central attention, here defined as the limitations in 
selecting among competing post-perceptual representations (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; 
Stroop, 1935).  Indeed, past studies have shown that central attention tasks can interfere 
with participants’ tracking ability (Allen, et al., 2006; Kunar et al., 2008; Tombu & Seiffert, 
2008).  However, interference between central attention and perceptual attention tasks 
are not limited to tracking, but occur in a wide variety of tasks including visual search, 
navigation, target detection, and the detection of unexpected stimuli (Fougnie & Marois, 
2007; Han & Kim, 2004; Strayer & Drews, 2007).  Therefore, such findings suggest that 
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distinctions between perceptual and central attention may not be as complete as 
suggested by past evidence and theoretical attention typologies (Giesbrecht, et al., 
2001; Johnston et al., 1995; Lavie et al., 2004; Pashler 1989; 1991; Posner & Peterson, 
1990; Vogel et al., 2005), but do not provide strong evidence that tracking draws to a 
greater extent on central attention than in dual-monitoring tasks.    Regardless of the 
reason that the current study provides a different pattern of result as those of past 
studies, the finding of strong, load-dependent costs between an auditory and visual 
tracking task places limits on the conditions under which domain-specificity in perceptual 
processing can be observed.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The degree to which attention and WM capacity limits depend on the nature of 
the stimuli being processed is a fundamental question about our cognitive architecture 
as it addresses the issue of the generality or the specificity of the processes that 
constrain our ability to represent our environment.  Do such stark limits, demonstrated by 
our failure to notice drastic changes in our environment over time and space (Simons & 
Levin, 1997; Rensink, 2002; Scholl, 2004), occur because of competition for a single, 
capacity-limited process?  Previous experimental findings offer no clear consensus and 
theoretical models provide conflicting answers (Baddeley, 1986; Cowan, 1995; Duncan, 
1994).  The goal of this research was to examine, within the context of both attention and 
working memory, the magnitude of dual-task costs between two sets of stimuli that 
differed in their modality and task-relevant feature(s).  I addressed this issue with a 
manipulation of task load, as load-dependent increases in dual-task costs are difficult to 
explain by costs in dual-task coordination or perceptual interference and therefore 
provide strong evidence for competition between tasks.   
In Chapter 2 it was found that auditory and spatial WM loads could be maintained 
independently, with no interference between modalities even when load was sufficiently 
high such that each task was beyond single-task capacity.  Several alternate 
explanations for the costs were ruled out.  Experiments 2-4 suggested that a lack of 
costs wasn’t due to articulatory rehearsal of the auditory stimuli.  Experiments 5 & 6 
refuted the possibility that long lasting sensory traces of the stimuli were eliminating the 
 91 
need for storage in WM.  Together, these results strongly argue that storage in WM is 
mediated largely by domain-specific systems.   
The experiments in Chapter 3 examined the domain-generality versus domain-
specificity of our limited perceptual attention.   In contrast to the findings of the previous 
chapter, strong dual-task costs were observed when auditory and visual tracking tasks 
were performed concurrently.  Furthermore, such costs were shown to be load-
dependent—they increased with increased secondary task difficulty.  These multi-modal 
costs were then compared to a uni-modal condition that paired two visual tasks: a gabor 
tracking task and a multiple object tracking task.  The overall dual-task costs did not 
differ across multi- and uni-modal conditions.  A subsequent analysis separately 
examined concurrence and load-dependent costs.  Concurrence costs were significantly 
higher in the uni-modal task combination, suggesting the contribution of a domain-
specific source of interference when tracking two visual stimuli (in addition to domain-
general costs that were equivalent in both experiments).  In contrast, load-dependent 
costs were equivalent in the multi- and uni-modal conditions.  While it is possible that the 
design was not sensitive enough to detect differences in load-dependent costs across 
experiments, the lack of any trend in this effect suggests that the costs of increasing 
tracking difficulty originate largely from domain-general sources.   
In trying to synthesize these two findings, the contrast in results for working 
memory and attention is striking.  Indeed, it would be difficult to accommodate these 
findings within a framework that suggests that capacity limits in attention and WM have a 
single underlying source (Cowan, 1995, 2006; Duncan, 1994; Rensink, 2002).  Instead, 
the dichotomous results are consistent with the idea that the capacities for attention and 
working memory originate from at least partially dissociable processes (Fougnie & 
Marois, 2006).  Our ability to maintain items in WM seems to originate from domain- and 
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perhaps stimulus-specific storage systems.  In contrast, our ability to selectively attend 
to some aspects of our environment depends at least partially on domain-general 
capacities.  These results provide support for frameworks with independent processing 
and storage mechanisms (Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Duff & Logie, 2001; Kane et al., 
2004; McElree, 2001; Oberauer, 2002; Oberauer et al., 2001).  In this framework, the 
term processing is linked to mechanisms of attention and the processes that update and 
manipulate working memory representations.  Storage refers to the short-term 
maintenance of information in the absence of processing.  Storage may be mediated by 
specialized rehearsal mechanisms (Baddeley & Logie, 1999), perhaps implemented 
through self-sustaining neural activity in cell assemblies that code for a particular 
stimulus attribute (Funahashi & Inoue, 2000; Hebb, 1949).  The current findings are 
consistent both with neurocomputational models of WM that describe how 
representations can be sustained by recurrent excitation in a neural network (Amit, et al., 
1994; Hopfield, 1982) and with experimental evidence showing that active rehearsal is 
not necessary for maintenance in VWM (Washburn & Astur, 1998),  
Processing and storage may be mediated by distinct mechanisms and serve 
distinct functional goals (Woodman & Vogel, 2005).  Indeed, consider if the only 
information we were able to store was that which we were currently processing.  Under 
such conditions, every time an unexpected event or object were to grab our senses, 
whatever was previously attended would be lost or would have to be retrieved from long-
term memory.  Thus, it doesn’t seem ideal that the contents of WM would be solely 
constrained by attention (Rensink, 2002).  More sensibly, WM can be considered a 
temporary but highly accessible store where important information can reside while the 
contents of attention shift to some highly salient event, or to multiple steps of a complex 
problem.  Indeed, while withdrawing attention can interfere with the storage of 
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information in VWM (Matsukura & Vecera, 2009; Oh & Kim, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 
2004), such costs can be explained by representational overlap.  Indeed, interference 
does not occur when the attention and VWM task differ in task-relevant features 
(Matsukura & Vecera, 2009; Woodman, et al., 2001).   
The lack of interference between auditory and spatial WM tasks reveals much 
about the mechanisms that allow for the temporary storage of perceptual information.  
These findings are consistent both with models that propose distinct storage structures 
for modalities (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Kane et al., 2004; 
Scarborough, 1972) and those that argue that a major limitation in WM is due to 
representational interference among stored stimuli (Johnson, et al., 2009; Oberauer & 
Kliegl, 2001, 2006; Olson & Poom, 2005). However, costs between auditory and 
visuospatial WM loads can interfere under some conditions.  Indeed, while dual-task 
costs were not observed in Experiments 1-6 & 9 of Chapter 2, significant costs were 
found in Experiments 7 and 8.  The source of these costs was attributed to the 
requirement to bind features into coherent objects.  Feature binding is an attentionally 
demanding process (Treisman & Gelade, 1980) and may draw on amodal sources of 
processing.  WM tasks that require the updating or manipulation of the contents of WM 
may also lead to domain-general costs (Garavan, 1998; McElree, 2001; Postle et al., 
2005; Oberauer, 2001, 2002; but see Mohr & Linden), as may tasks that require the 
selection of target stimuli among distractors (Vogel, McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005).   
Perceptual tracking revealed a cognitive capacity that is at least partially distinct 
from the demands posed by the WM tasks.  The theories that propose distinct storage 
and processing mechanisms are both underspecified and inadequate to fully explain 
perceptual tracking capacity. Processing is typically defined as an amodal, 
undifferentiated resource (Duff & Logie, 2001; Oberauer, 2002), but the term lacks the 
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precision to define what does and what does not require processing.  In addition, the 
source of both domain-general and domain-independent costs in perceptual tracking 
shows, in conjunction with evidence for multiple forms of attentional selection 
(Giesbrecht, et al., 2001; Johnston et al., 1995; Lavie et al., 2004; Pashler 1989; 1991; 
Vogel et al., 2005), that our attentional limits are constrained by a complex cognitive 
architecture not easily explained by such frameworks.   
The strong costs between auditory and visual tracking tasks differ from the 
findings of previous studies that rely on dual-monitoring tasks.  This difference in findings 
could have occurred because past paradigms were not ideal for revealing limits in 
perceptual capacity or because tracking and monitoring draw on distinct limits of 
selection.  The present results are insufficient to provide a definitive answer to the 
source of difference in findings across paradigms.  However, the fact that increasing 
tracking speed led to a domain-general cost in performance suggests that a 
manipulation of the perceptual difficulty of a tracking task can draw on amodal sources. 
Future work is necessary to build on this finding and rule out alternate explanations.  
However, evidence for both domain-specific and domain-general sources of tracking 
capacity is consistent both with single resource theories that allow for potential structural 
interference within a modality (Kahneman, 1973) and with theories that posit a single 
domain-general source of attentional control that acts to modulate perceptual processing 
in modality-specific sensory cortex (Johnson, et al., 2005; Laurienti, et al., 2002).  
A goal of the present work was to help constrain theory by exploring the 
generality and specificity of both attention and working memory.  The results provide 
further evidence against a single, common capacity that underlies attention and working 
memory (Cowan, 2006; Rensink 2002).  Instead, the results suggest that our limited 
capacity in representing our environment is due to the interplay of several factors.  
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Whether dual-task results reveal domain-general or domain-specific costs may depend 
on whether the tasks draw on processing or storage and the stage(s) of processing 
where task demand exceeds capacity.  While current theoretical frameworks predict and 
explain some of the above distinctions, no framework encompasses them all.   
The dual-task paradigm provides a powerful tool to examine the overlap in 
cognitive processes between two tasks.  However, care is needed in designing 
appropriate dual-task designs.  One must consider whether there is a source of costs 
ancillary to the goal of the study that could impact the results. For example, if an auditory 
and visual task both use spatial coordinate frames, interference between these tasks 
may reflect representational costs rather than competition for a limited capacity process.  
Additionally, a lack of costs may not be sufficient to conclude no overlap between tasks 
unless sufficient care is taken to ensure that overall difficulty is sufficient and that 
performance cannot be assisted by some other process. Finally, rather than simply 
including single- and dual-task conditions, it is ideal to also increase the dual-task load.  
This load manipulation provides a way to measure dual-task costs that cannot be due to 
the executive demands of performing two tasks.  In interpreting the dual-task costs it is 
important to have a good baseline for comparing a lack of costs (usually a single-task 
condition) and a putative ceiling where extensive overlap should occur (in the current 
studies this was the uni-modal condition in Chapter 3, and the set-size manipulation in 
Chapter 2).  This allows cross-experiment comparisons to measure the extent of costs.  
While the findings of Chapter 2 and 3 are important within the context of attention and 
working memory, the overall framework of dual-tasking that was developed here should 
be valuable to many fields that examine the generality versus specificity of mental 
faculties in topics ranging from intelligence (Jensen, 1998; Spearman, 1927) to long-term 
memory (Toth & Hunt, 1999; Tulving, 1985).  
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